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rise to associational issues and the considerations relevant
to their resolution. It does not attempt to develop a general
theory of free association because, given the unresolvable
value disputes underlying all associational issues, I am
skeptical about the possibility of developing such a general
theory. Unpacking how differing associational issues are
resolved in practice within and among societies should,
however, shed some light on those values.
Part A outlines the types of situations in which
associational issues arise. How associational issues are
resolved greatly depends on whether a more individualistic
or collective perspective is brought to bear. Part B
develops this point in general through a discussion of both
Locke and Aristotle. Part C illustrates the point through a
brief excursion into the institution of marriage. Part D
analyzes in more detail how the process plays out regarding
conflicts among society's members. Part E then analyzes
the process when society itself is a party.
. Types of Associational Issues
Associational conflicts abound in social life.
Within a society Party A may wish to associate with Party
B, who, in turn, may not wish to associate with Party A.
Examples of this include: A's desire, not shared by B, to be
friends with, to marry or to remain married to B, A's desire
to go to school with or live in the same neighborhood as B,
to belong to the same club or professional association as B,
2
and many more. To resolve these conflicts, society could

1For other treatments of free association, see, e.g., FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION (Amy Gutman ed., 1998) (articles discussing the
importance of free association within a society and factors relevant to

the resolution of conflicts over free association).
2 Even situations as seemingly impersonal as taxation, when society
seeks to compel those who do not want to participate to financially
support public programs that benefit others, entail associational

2
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empower A to force the association on B, empower B to
avoid the association, or resolve the matter itself by taking
into account the wishes of the parties and other
considerations it deems relevant.
On the other hand, Party A and Party B may wish to
have an association that society finds objectionable or,
conversely, to avoid an association that society desires.
Under such circumstances, society must decide whether to
abide by the wishes of the parties or to prevent or compel
the association despite the parties' wishes. Examples of
preventing associations that parties wish to have include the
regulation of sexual behavior and criminalizing
conspiracies in restraint of trade. Examples of compelling
associations parties do not wish to have include the draft
and forced integration.
Moreover, society itself may be a party to an
associational conflict. Examples include when someone
wants to leave or enter a society against society's wishes,
or when people occupying part of a society wish
unilaterally to secede. In these instances, society must
decide whether to accede to the other party or attempt to
impose its will on that party. At times, all the parties
involved in an associational conflict may be societies.
Examples include territorial disputes and treaty withdrawal.
Here, the international community may try to intervene in a
way similar to a society's resolution of conflicts among its
members. In the absence of such intervention, societies
have to work it out amo ng themselves.
In all these associational contexts, some individual
or entity ultimately must control whether an association
exists. Parties cannot simultaneously be both friends and
not friends, be married and not married, attend integrated
and segregated schools, participate together in some
conflicts. A relationship between parties on a purely financial level is
still a type of association and poses questions that resemble those
arising in more intimate associations.

3
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societal venture and not participate together, be a member
and not be a member of society, be a party and not be a
party to a treaty. All societies have methods-through law,
custom, and at times brute force-for allocating the power
to control the outcome in such associational contexts and to
compel or induce the adherence of their members and
others. The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in
which that power is allocated in order to identify and
evaluate the considerations that underlie differing
resolutions of associational conflicts in divergent social
contexts.
II. Who Should Control: Individual and Collective
Perspectives
One's view of the appropriate resolution of
associational conflicts and who should control the outcome
depends to a great degree on one's view of the nature of
social life. In particular, it depends upon the extent to
which one takes an individualistic or communal view of
social life.
3 This is not the place to attempt a thorough explanation of the meaning

of the concept "society," which involves such factors as
interdependence, common values and culture, authoritative institutions,
territoriality, and the perception of its members. Generally, I use
society to refer to something on the order of a country or nation.
Depending on which factors are emphasized, however, the concept is
flexible enough to include associations from those as small as a nuclear
family to the world community as a whole. Consequently, it is possible
for someone to be a member of many societies at the same time, both
public and private and with or without a formal governmental structure.
Each society may have its particular method of resolving associational
issues, although the types of considerations that come into play may
correspond. On the nuances in meaning of the concepts of society,
community and nation, and on their constitutive factors, see generally,
KARL W. DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY (1966); ANTHONY

D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY (1991).

4
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The extreme individualistic view posits the primacy
of the individual. 4 The individual precedes society and all
relationships. Society and any relationship is only
justifiable or consistent with the rights of the individual
when people freely choose to enter society or form
relationships.
The extreme communal view posits the primacy of
the collective over the individual.5 People are inevitably
and unavoidably enmeshed in relationships because they
are, by nature, social animals born into relationships not
only with their parents but on some level with all others.
Their fates are inescapably intertwined with the fates of all
others, their welfare inescapably interdependent with the
welfare of all others, and in some way, all of their actions
affect all others and the actions of all others affect them. 6
Consequently, many relationships that may seem to
be freely chosen or rejected are, in fact, highly conditioned
by the social circumstances in which people find
themselves. And society at large has a legitimate interest in
preventing and imposing relationships in the name of the
common good. Even those relationships that are left to
private choice entail a collective decision that society is
better off by treating them as such.
The reality of social life in all modem, and perhaps
all historical, societies is some blend of individualistic and
communal thinking. Some types of relationships are more
4 As expressed, for example, in the philosophies of John Locke and
Robert Nozick. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF

GOVERNMENT (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal Arts Press 1952)
1690); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).

As expressed, for example, in the philosophies of Aristotle and
Michael J. Sandel. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Stephen Everson
ed., Cambridge University Press 1988); MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).

6 Even death does not fully avoid relationships, which may continue in

the form of obligations imposed on one's estate or of the influence one
continues to have on others after death.

5
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or less freely chosen, while others are more or less
involuntary or imposed. Often the line between free
choice, involuntariness, and imposition is blurry.
Moreover, the treatment of particular relationships as more
open to choice or as more subject to imposition is a
function of both individualistic and collective
considerations that may cut both ways. In most instances,
it is possible to advance both types of considerations for or
against treating relationships as open to choice or subject to
imposition.
This interplay between the individual and the
collective is found in even the most individualistic and
communal thinkers. Consider, for example, Locke and
Aristotle, who certainly represent thinkers close to the
opposite ends of the spectrum. For Locke, political-and
by extension social-life begins when people in "a state of
perfect freedom.., by their own consents... make
themselves members of some body politic." 7 Within given
societies, people then "by compact and agreement"
establish rules regarding the control and distribution of
property and other resources, 8 and "by common consent"
states do the same as among themselves. 9 Locke's
emphasis on consent, which is at the heart of contemporary
libertarianism, 10 is a highly individualistic view that at first
blush would seem to make it difficult to ever justify
imposing a political or any other relationship on someone.
7 LocKE,supra note 4, at 4, 11. "Men being, as has been said, by

nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this
estate without his own consent." Id. at 54.
1LocKE,supra note 4, at 27.
9Id.

10See NOZICK, supra note 4, at 334 ('Voluntary consent opens the
border for crossings ....
Treating us with respect by respecting our
rights, [the minimal state] allows us, individually or with whom we
choose, to choose our life and to realize our ends and our conception of
ourselves, in so far as we can, aided by the voluntary cooperation of
other individuals possessing the same dignity.").

6
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Yet several qualifications bring collective
considerations into play. First is the obligation Locke
imposes on people not to use their freedom so as "to harm
another,"" and the related limitation on their right to freely
appropriate the common resources of the state of nature
that they leave "enough and as good... in common for
others.' 2 These qualifications force people into
relationships with others in three ways: by having to take
the interests of others into account in planning one's own
behavior; by having to respond to the complaints of others
that one has violated the qualifications; or by having to
bargain and coordinate with others so as to minimize
conflict over and prevent overexploitation of resources.
Such necessities help explain why Nozick describes the
development of his Lockean Minimal State less as a
voluntary coming together than as a spontaneous, almost
automatic process.13
Second, even with regard to voluntary political
relationships, once someone "by actual agreement and any
express declaration" consents thereto, the person becomes
"subject to the government and dominion of that
commonwealth as long as it has a being.., and can never
again be in the liberty of the state of nature. 14 Moreover,
once someone becomes a member of a society "he
authorizes the society... to make laws for him as the
I' LocKE, supra note 4, at 5.
12Id. at 17.
13 NozicK, supra note 4, at 10-25, 108-19 (describing the "invisiblehand" process by which a "minimal state" arises out of the anarchic
state of nature as a means of people's protecting their rights and
interests). "Out of anarchy, pressed by spontaneous groupings, mutualprotection associations, division of labor, market pressures, economies
of scale, and rational self-interest, there arises something very much
resembling a minimal state or a group of geographically distinct
minimal states." Id. at 16-17.
14 LOcKE, supra note 4, at 69.

7
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public good of the society shall require,"15 and within the
society, "the majority have a right to act and conclude the
rest.",16 In short, by consensually entering into a societal
relationship, one may not withdraw from that relationship
and is then subject to, or is deemed to have consented to,
many other types of relationships imposed upon the party
pursuant to collective considerations.
Locke must, of course, deal with the question of
people who are born into already existing societies, which
is to say most people throughout history. If after a
society's initial consensual founding everyone born into it
automatically and irrevocably became members of it, this
would be the end of the consensual nature of political
relationships. Consequently, Locke propounds that "a child
is born subject to no country or government,"' 7 and upon
is "at liberty what government he will
becoming an adult 18
under.,
put himself
As a practical matter, however, the exercise of that
liberty is often highly constrained and subtle. Thus, "the
son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father but
under the same terms his father did, by becoming a member
of the society."' 19 Moreover, the socialization process and a
multitude of economic and emotional bonds that exist in all
societies inhibit most people from choosing to join a
society other than their own. Thus, the process of consent
is such that "people take no notice of it and, thinking it not
done at all, or not necessary, conclude they are naturally
subjects as they are men." 20 Finally, unlike in Locke's
time, the world is now divided into nation-states that
strictly regulate entry, thereby creating significant legal
"
at 50.
16 Id.

Id.
at 55.
67.
68.
19 Id.
at 67.
17
Id.
at
18Id.
at

20 Id.

8
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obstacles to expatriation. It is only a short step to a general
view that, in reality, many relationships are far from
voluntary, and that the appearance of consent is often
illusory and masks the largely socially constructed nature
of relationships.
This view readily comports with Aristotle's.
Aristotle's starting point, unlike Locke's "state of perfect
freedom," is that "man is by nature a political animal. 21
Rather than arising from consent, the state is a "creation of
nature," 22 and is "clearly prior to the family and to the
individual." 23 Social life is an involuntary relationship
because "a social instinct is implanted in all men by nature"
24
and "the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing."
From this starting point, Aristotle posits a variety of
involuntary relationships in social life. One is the
relationship of ruler and ruled: "For that someone should
rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but
expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked
out for subjection, others for rule., 25 For Aristotle this
extends to gender relationships, in that "the male is by
nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules,
and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, entails to
21 ARISTOTLE,

supra note 5, at 3.

22 id.
23Id. at4.

24 Id. Compare SANDEL, supra note 5, at 150:
To say that the members of a society are bound by a sense
of community is not simply to say that a great many of
them profess communitarian sentiments and pursue
communitarian aims, but rather that they conceive their
identity... as defined to some extent by the community
of which they are a part. For them, community describes
... not a relationship they choose (as in a voluntary
association) but an attachment they discover, not merely
an attribute but a constituent of their identity.
25 ARISTOTLE,

supra note 5, at 6.

9
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all mankind."26 It is possible to reject Aristotle's view of
class and gender roles and still find a case for the nonconsensual nature of many social relationships.
Yet, bearing in mind that the notion of individual
rights was not highly developed in his era, Aristotle's
philosophy also contains the yin-yang of communal and
individualistic thinking.27 Thus, subject to its regulation for
the common good, Aristotle supports private ownership of
property 2 8-the essence of which, as modem commentators
have noted, is the owner's power to choose with whom to
associate regarding its use. 29 Aristotle's reasons have both
26

1d. at7.
27 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Terence Irwin trans.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 1985). For Aristotle, one's ethical duties
regarding how one should treat others derive from the pursuit of one's
highest end, which is happiness. Happiness is properly sought through
the development of one's excellences and virtues, which include the
way one treats others. See also THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE 1-24
(H. M. Currie ed., 1973) (discussing the roots of respect for the
individual in ancient Greek and Roman democracies, and the
maturation in Western civilization since the Renaissance and
Reformation of "the essential dignity and sanctity of human life,
freedom of thought and criticism.... popular government.. ., [and]
the rule of law based on the impartial administration ofjustice"
beginning with the Renaissance and Reformation periods (at 5)).
28 "It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it
common; and the special business of the legislature is to create in men
this benevolent disposition." ARISTOTLE,supra note 5, at 26. "The
true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the
few, or the many govern with a view to the common interest." Id. at
61.
29 See, e.g., Thomas Kleven, PrivatePropertyand Democratic
Socialism, 21 LEGAL STUD. F. 1, 12-21 (1997) ("Ownership confers
decision making power over things, the right to determine how things
are to be used and who may have access to them, which in turn means
that others who do not have the right to share therein, i.e., who are not
co-owners, have the duty not to interfere with the owner's control." (at
18)); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth
Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29
BUFF. L. REV. 325, 360 (1980) ("To say that one owned property was

10
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collective and individualistic overtones. "[W]hen a man
feels a thing to be his own," this contributes to personal
pleasure and thereby to the development of one's
excellence; 30 the greatest pleasure is "doing a kindness or
service [to others], which can only be rendered when a man
has private property.'
Private property enables people to
"set an example of liberality" or "liberal action," deriving
from "the use which is made of property., 32 Finally, "there
is much more quarreling among those who have all things
in common, 3 3 such that with private property "men will
not complain of one another, and they will make more
progress, because everyone will be attending to his own
business. ' 34
In addition, though people are naturally political
animals, Aristotle acknowledges that "they are also brought
together by their common interests, 35 implying that free
choice is at play in establishing political relationships.
Furthermore, while Aristotle is not an unadulterated
advocate of democracy, he does note as among its virtues
that "a man should live as he likes," 36 a further
acknowledgement of freedom of choice in relationships.

to say that the owner had some set of rights, privileges, powers and

immunities. Moreover, one who did not own property had a set of no
rights, duties, disabilities, and liabilities relative to the owner.") But
compare State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971) (overturning
trespass conviction of legal services attorney and poverty worker
assisting migrant farm workers on ground that a property owner does
not have the right to prohibit visits with farm workers in on-premises
living quarters so as to deny them "opportunity to enjoy associations
customary among our citizens").
30 ARISTOTLE,
31 Id.
32

supra note 5, at 26.

1d. at 27.

33 Id.
34 Id. at 26.

31 Id. at 60.
36

Id. at 144.

11
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To conclude this part of the discussion, I do not
propose to try to resolve here which of the foregoing
perspectives, the individualistic or the communal, is the
more correct or appropriate for addressing associational
issues. Indeed, the debate over that question probably
cannot be resolved. In the real world, most or all societies
have an ethos that incorporates some aspects of both
approaches, albeit with differing emphases in different
societies. Therefore, we should expect to find divergent
societies resolving associational issues differently in
keeping with the nuances of their mores. And within
societies, we should expect to find associational issues
resolved differently over time as mores evolve.
IlI. The Institution of Marriage
To illustrate how societies resolve associational
issues differently from each other and over time, let us
briefly consider the institution of marriage. In the United
States, the establishment of a marital relationship is widely
viewed as the choice of the two parties, both of whom must
agree and either one of whom may block its establishment.
In this context, the party who does not want an association
prevails over the party who does and, therefore, controls
the outcome.
Both individualistic and collective values, flowing
from cultural notions of what marriage entails, would seem
to underlie this arrangement. From an individualistic
perspective, to force one to marry against one's will would
violate human dignity and the fundamental right to control
one's destiny with regard to such personal matters. The
intimacy of marriage, ideally based on love and typically
involving sexual relations, is one obvious element. More
collective notions are also likely at work, such as the
importance of marriage based on mutual choice to the
success of the nuclear family and, in turn, the perceived

12
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importance of the nuclear family to the successful
functioning of society.
Underlying all these elements are debatable value
judgments. A society in which the extended family is a
more important institution than the nuclear family might
well see marriage based on love and mutual choice as
promoting the nuclear family at the expense of the
extended family. This may help explain the practice in
some societies of arranged marriages, perhaps more
common in the past, though still found today.3 7 Those
societies may view marriage based on intense interpersonal
intimacy and mutual choice as weakening the ties to other
members of the extended family and leading couples to
separate themselves from it. In marriages arranged by
one's family or parents, on the other hand, it is common for
the new couple to live with one of their families, thereby
strengthening extended family ties.

37 See, e.g., GWEN J. BROUDE, MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND
RELATIONSHIPS: A CROSS-CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 192-95 (1994)
(comparing arranged marriage practices in various cultures); Xu

Xiaohe & Martin King White, Love Matches and ArrangedMarriages,
NEXT OF KIN 420 (Lome Tepperman & Susannah J. Wilson, eds. 1993)
(comparing and contrasting arranged marriage practices in China and

Japan). For articles on recent efforts at reform in societies with
historical traditions of patriarchal marital practices, including arranged
marriage, see, e.g., Michele Brandt & Jeffrey A. Kaplan, The Tension

Between Women's Rights and Religious Rights: Reservations to
CEDA W by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 105
(1995-96); Mark Cammack et al., Legislating Social Change in an
Islamic Society - Indonesia's MarriageLaw, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 45

(1996); Anna M. Han, Holding Up More Than Half the Sky:
Marketization and the Status of Women in China, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 791 (2001); Sherifa Zuhur, Empowering Women or

Dislodging Sectarianism:Civil Marriagein Lebanon, 14 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 177 (2002); Shirley L. Wang, Note, The Maturation of

Gender Equality Into Customary InternationalLaw, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 899 (1995).

13
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Without question, arranged marriages have often
taken into account the wishes of the parties. When it does
not, arranged marriage is an example of an association that
one or both of the parties may not want. While ultimately
it may be difficult to force an adamantly unwilling party to
marry, various social pressures may be applied to induce
compliance. Threats of disinheritance and ostracism have
frequently been used, even in societies as individualistic as
the United States, to induce compliance with parental
wishes, and some societies have condoned or accepted even
the killing of a recalcitrant child.3 8
While mutual choice is the prevailing approach to
the establishment of a marriage in this society, the right to
freely choose to marry has been severely limited by
requirements such as being unmarried and of different
genders. Such requirements reflect societal concerns, like
promoting procreation or perceived moral offensiveness,
that are thought to trump the value of individual choice,
even with regard to a matter as intimate as marriage. For
example, anti-polygamy laws might be justified as
protecting women and children from perceived oppression
or ensuring that there are potential partners for everyone
who wants to marry. Banning same-sex marriage might be
justified as promoting procreation or preventing practices
that violate societal mores. Nevertheless, polygamy has
been widely practiced in other societies, and there are

38

For reports on countries where "honor killings" of women are

common for various reasons, including refusal to submit to arranged

marriages, and on the indifference and complicity of the authorities,
see, e.g., Amnesty International, Pakistan:HonorKillings ofGirls and
Women, at http://www.anesty.org/library(Doc.# ASA 33/018/1999);
Gendercide Watch, Case Study: "HonourKillings and Blood Feuds,"
at http://www.gendercide.org/case-honour.html; Human Rights Watch,

Violence Against Women and "Honor" Crimes, at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/04/unorall 2_0405.htm.

14
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strong individual rights claims for allowing it. 39 The same
is true for same-sex marriage, for which movements exist
here and elsewhere. 4°
39

For divergent views regarding polygamy, see, e.g., Keith E. Sealing,

Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional
ProvisionsAgainst Polygamy Are UnconstitutionalUnder the Free
Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 691 (2001 ) (arguing that antipolygamy laws intentionally discriminate against Mormons without a
legitimate secular purpose); Maura I. Strassberg, DistinctionsofForm
or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75
N.C.L. REv. 1501 (1997) (arguing that anti-polygamy laws are
justifiable per the contribution of polygamy to despotic and
inegalitarian societies and of monogamy to the modem liberaldemocratic state); Stephanie Forbes, Note, Why Have Just One?: An
Evaluation of the Anti-Polygamy Laws under the Establishment Clause,
3 9 Hous. L. REV. 1517 (2003) (arguing that laws banning polygamy
violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment per
promotion of particular religious views and absence of an overriding
secular purpose); Richard A. Vasquez, Note, The Practiceof
Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise ofReligion or Legitimate Public
Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. & POL'Y, 225 (2001-2002)
(arguing that harms of polygamy to women and children constitute a
compelling government interest justifying its prohibition).
40 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass.
2003) (finding that denial of benefits of civil marriage to same-sex
partners infringes fundamental rights of individual liberty and equality
in violation of Massachusetts Constitution); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d
864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that exclusion of same sex couples from
benefits and protections of marriage violates Common Benefits Clause
of Vermont Constitution); Clifford Krauss, Gay MarriagePlan: Sign of
Sweeping Social Change in Canada,N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at 8A
(reporting on Canada's decision to legalize same-sex marriage). For
arguments in favor of same -sex marriage, see, e.g., Elvia R. Arriola,
Law and the Family of Choice and Need, 35 LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 691
(1996-1997); MARK STROSSER, LEGALLY WED 23-74 (1997) (arguing
that bans on same sex marriages violate the Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses); Cindy Tobisman, Marriagevs. Domestic
Partnership:Will We Ever ProtectLesbians'Families,12 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 112 (1997). For arguments against or counseling a
gradual approach to the recognition of same -sex marriage, see, e.g.,
George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of TraditionalMarriage, 15 J.L. &
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The free choice model is also not fully applicable to
the termination of a marriage through divorce. In some
societies, including the United States in earlier times,
divorce has been nearly impossible to obtain, even when
both parties desire it. 4 1 When divorce became generally

permitted in the United States, it was ordinarily necessary
to show a cause such as adultery, desertion, or cruelty.42
This usually posed little problem when both parties wanted
out since they could stipulate to, or fabricate, a cause.43
But a requirement of cause could pose a substantial
obstacle when one party wanted out and the other did not.
In such instances, the party wanting the association to
continue controlled if the party not wanting it was unable to
POLITICS 581 (1999); Linda S. Eckols, The MarriageMirage: The
PersonalandSocial IdentityImplications of Same-GenderMatrimony,
5 MiciI. J. GENDER& L. 353 (1999).
41 Most of Europe, prior to the 1800s, was largely influenced
by
religious doctrine proclaiming the indissolubility of marriage. Divorce
was virtually unknown and annulment very hard to obtain. Couples
who wanted out of marriage had to settle for living apart while
remaining formally married. Likewise in colonial America, divorce
was difficult to obtain and uncommon, especially in the South,
although legislative divorces were occasionally granted. After
independence, the situation in the South remained the same while
largely restrictive judicial divorce laws were developed in some
Northern states. By 1880, legislative divorce was dead and most states
had general divorce laws of varying degrees of stringency. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCEM. FRIEDMAN, AHISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 181-82, 43640 (1973); MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND
THE LAW 7-27 (1972).

Comprehensive divorce laws began to arise in the United States in
the mid-1800s. Although initially a few states established fairly
permissive grounds for divorce, by the late 1800s restrictive divorce
laws were the norm. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 436-40;
RHEINSTEIN,supra note 41, at 28-55; Walter Wadlington, Divorce
Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 35-44 (1966).
43 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 439 ("collusion was
a way of
life"); RHEINSTEIN, supra note 41, at 55-63; Elizabeth S. Scott,
Rational DecisionmakingAbout MarriageandDivorce, 76 VA. L. REV.
9,15-16(1990).
42

16

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1]

85

show cause. While the party wanting out might be able to
physically leave, so that the parties were no longer living
together as a married couple, the formality of the marriage
and its attendant legal and social obligations would still
remain.
It is possible to reconcile the requirement of cause
with the mutual choice model. The choice to marry in the
face of the cause requirement could be seen as akin to an
agreement not to sever the association without cause. This
rationale would seem more convincing if the parties could
choose to marry under either a regime permitting unilateral
divorce or a regime requiring cause, as is currently being
tried or considered in some states. 44 When the only
available option is divorce for cause, individuals who want
the benefits of marriage are induced by society to have their
ability to exit the relationship limited by the wishes of the
other party. This empowers the party who wants the
relationship to continue.
Currently in the United States, a marital relationship
is fairly easily severed through divorce because most states
either have no-fault divorce or impose easily proven
standards, such as incompatibility or irreconcilable
differences. 45 Consequently, when one party wants a
44 Both Arizona and Louisiana have recently adopted "covenant

marriage" statutes enabling parties to choose to marry under a system
requiring traditional fault grounds for divorce rather than the generally
applicable no-fault system. ARiz. REv. STAT. §25-901 etseq. (1998);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:272-75,307 (1997).
45 See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN
LAW 64-81 (1987) (identifying eighteen states as having divorce on nofault grounds only, two as requiring mutual consent for no-fault
divorce, and thirty states as having mixed fault and no-fault systems
that impose various waiting periods for contested unilateral no -fault
divorce; and comparing the United States to Western Europe);
HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF

DIVORCE LAW INTHE UNITED STATES 1-2,43-103 (1988) (detailing the
history of the no-fault movement in the United States); Wadlington,
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marriage to continue and the other wants out, the latter
controls. Yet, although unilateral divorce is now fairly
easy, society's requirement of support for ex-spouses and
children impinges on one party's ability to terminate all
aspects of the relationship against the will of the other
party. Support requirements might be rationalized in a
number of ways, involving both individualistic and
collective concerns: on the basis of a party's having
voluntarily undertaken such obligations by choosing to
marry or have children; or of the perceived unfairness of
allowing total exit when a less well-off spouse may have
foregone opportunities for self-sufficiency in the interest of
the marital or family relationship; or of a judgment that
individuals should be responsible for providing for their
offspring rather than leaving it entirely to the other parent
or to society as a whole; or of the contribution of support
requirements to the preservation of the nuclear family as an
integral societal institution. In any event, support
requirements depart, at least to some degree, from total
freedom to exit an unwanted relationship that another party
wants. In fact, support requirements may be imposed even
against the wishes of both parties to a divorce, as through
laws requiring divorcees to reimburse the state for welfare
benefits paid to ex-spouses and children. 46
In sum, despite the intimacy of the marital
relationship, societies frequently intervene through law and
social practice to prevent people who want to marry from
doing so and to compel or induce people who do not want
to marry or remain married to do so. Both individualistic
and collective considerations govern the institution of
marriage, and different balances are struck among and
within societies.
supra note 42, at 44-52 (discussing the operation of divorce laws based
on incompatibility).

See Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy:
Implications of the 1996 Welfare Act, 30 FAM. L.Q. 519 (1996).
46
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IV. Associational Considerations Among Parties Within
a Society
In this section I intend to flesh out more thoroughly
some of the considerations relevant to deciding who should
control the existence or non-existence of associations
among society's members. 47 Assume a society is deciding
(i) whether to allow, prohibit or mandate particular
relationships, and (ii) who should control the outcome in
case of conflict over the existence of a relationship. Every
such society will have a bias, derived from its culture and
mores, about the relative significance of the decision of
various individual and collective considerations.4 8
Although these biases will often produce different
outcomes in similar associational contexts, the
considerations that come into play may yet be the same.
Like the concept of society, supra note 3, the concept of membership
is complex and variable, depending on the emphasis placed on the
various factors that might be thought relevant, such as formal
citizenship, voluntarily joining and/or agreeing to be a member, and
presence in a society and/or participation in its activities. Since
members of a society frequently receive more favorable treatment than
non-members, the issue of whether someone is a societal member may
be hotly contested. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text
regarding the lesser rights of prospective immigrants. See also Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Equal Protection Clause applies to
undocumented alien children present within state such that state must
provide free public education to citizens and lawful aliens); Martinez v.
Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (finding no violation of the Equal
Protection Clause where state denies free public education to children
residing in district for primary purpose of attending public school).
48 In this society, for example, when the law is silent, the presumption
is that parties are free to mutually decide to have or not to have an
association. An alternative approach is possible, at least with respect to
the establishment of an association; namely that all associations require
prior collective approval. That the former rather than the latter is the
case reflects the society's individualistic bias.
47
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A. Terminatingan Existing Relationship
Since individual freedom is so highly valued in this
society, let us assume that interpersonal relations are
ordinarily up to the parties involved. 49 Also assume in case
of conflict that the party not wanting a relationship
ordinarily controls, unless there are sufficient
countervailing considerations either to socialize the
decision or to empower the other party to control. First, let
us address a party desiring to terminate an existing
relationship voluntarily entered into that the other party
wants to continue.5 °
49 Like the concepts of society and membership, what it means to say

that someone is involved in a relationship is subject to a variety of
interpretations depending on such factors as whether they have agreed
to the relationship and their degree of interdependence with others.
With a common destiny, there is a sense in which everyone in the
world is involved in a mutual relationship. However, the extent of the
relationship may have legal significance. For example, laws requiring
parental consent before a minor can obtain an abortion seem premised
on the existence of a relationship with the child that warrants parental
involvement in the decision, subject to the child's right to opt out of
that aspect of the parent-child relationship if the child can demonstrate
sufficient maturity to a judge who thereby becomes involved in the
decision as a kind of surrogate parent. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In contrast, holding that parents have
the right to deny visitation privileges to grandparents seems premised
on the absence of a sufficiently strong grandparent-child relationship to
overcome the parent-child relationship. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57 (2000). See also, infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text
(regarding lesser rights of prospective immigrants as against societal
members).
50 Where one party wants out of an existing relationship and the other
does not, several resolutions are possible. One is to allow unilateral
termination. A second is to allow unilateral termination subject to the
requirement that the party wanting out somehow compensate the other
party. A third possible resolution is to allow the party wanting the
relationship to continue to specifically enforce the agreement against
unilateral termination. Finally, a fourth possible resolution is to allow
specific performance subject to the requirement that the party wanting
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As noted above with regard to marriage,
individualistic considerations do not necessarily support the
right of a party wanting out always to have the absolute
privilege to completely terminate an existing relationship
against the will of the other party. Suppose at the inception
of a relationship the parties agree that the relationship may
be terminated only by mutual agreement and that neither
shall have the right to terminate it unilaterally. If one party
later wants out, the other who does not want out might
claim that the first party has thereby voluntarily waived
whatever right not to have or continue an unwanted
relationship it might otherwise have had. To reject such a
claim, it is necessary to treat the unilateral right to
terminate an unwanted relationship as inalienable, thereby
making the stipulation against unilateral termination void.
A commitment to individualism may support
viewing some individual rights as inalienable, as when
parting with those rights would overly undermine what it
means to be a person and pervert a commitment to

in somehow compensate the party wanting out. See Guido Calabresi &
Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabilty:
One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Only the
first alternative fully satisfies the individualistic claim of an absolute
privilege to terminate an unwanted relationship over the other party's
objection. The second alternative is next most favorable to the party
wanting out, but it is inconsistent with an absolute privilege to
terminate because having to compensate the other party impinges on
the privilege and may at times be so costly as to induce someone to
remain in an unwanted relationship. Furthermore, it entails a
concession to the party wanting a relationship to continue, empowers
that party in bargaining over the relationship's future, and requires that
the relationship continue in the form of whatever the required
compensation consists of. Still this second alternative, as well as the
third and fourth which are even more favorable to the party wanting in,
are all consistent with an individualistic approach to social life.
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individualism. 5' For example, it might be claimed that
people have an inalienable right to life and liberty, and thus
should not be permitted to agree to allow others to kill or
enslave them. 52 But, as the debate over physician assisted
suicide shows, it is far from clear that a commitment to
individualism supports making even these fundamental
rights inalienable in all instances.53 It is even possible to
claim that inalienability itself is inconsistent with a
commitment to individualism because people should be
free to part with all their individual rights, at least as long
as they do so voluntarily and without coercion (assuming
that to be a possible state of affairs - a point to be

developed more fully below). 55
The problem in the present context is that there are
competing individual rights claims. Disallowing unilateral
withdrawal from a relationship limits the freedom of the
party wanting out, but allowing it also impacts the freedom
51 See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARV. L.

REV. 1849 (1987) (arguing for the non-commodification of aspects of
the self that are integral to personhood).
52 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 95 (W.W. Norton & Co.
1975) (1859) ("The principle of freedom cannot require that [someone]
should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate
Ione's] freedom.").
3 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (assistance
for terminally ill patients in committing suicide not a fundamental
liberty interest protected by Due Process Clause); Raphael CohenAlmagor & Monica G. Hartman, The Oregon Death With Dignity Act:
Review and Proposalsfor Improvement, 27 J. LEGIs. 269 (2001); Neil
M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia,23 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599 (2000); Christine N. O'Brien et al., Oregon's
Guidelinesfor Physician-AssistedSuicide: A Legal andEthical
Analysis, 61 U. Prrr. L. REv. 329 (2000); PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE
(Robert F. Weir ed., 1997); Melvin I. Urofsky, JustifyingAssisted
Suicide: Comments on the OngoingDebate, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETICS & PUB. POL'Y 893 (2000).
54 See, e.g., NoZICK, supra note 4, at 58, 331 (arguing that a free
society must allow someone to consent to being killed or enslaved).
55 See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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of the party wanting in. Thus, the assertion that a party has
an inalienable right to unilaterally withdraw from any
relationship, even after agreeing otherwise, must contend
with the individual right claim of the party wanting the
relationship to continue that it has changed its position and
passed up other opportunities in reliance on the agreement.
Arguing that the party wanting in has no legitimate claim of
detrimental reliance, because that party should realize at the
outset and thus assumes the risk that the other's right to
withdraw is inalienable, is not sufficient to rebut this claim.
The issue is whether individual rights considerations
provide greater support for the recognition of an inalienable
right of unilateral termination, or for a right to hold a party
to an agreement not to unilaterally withdraw, or at least for
a right to be compensated in the event thereof.
When conflicting individual rights are implicated,
which will often if not always be the case, one must decide
whose interests are weightier. This requires a contextual
analysis of which side's interests seem stronger under the
circumstances. For example, the claim for a right to
unilaterally withdraw from a marriage seems stronger
when, shortly after marrying, one party wants out and the
other stands to suffer no more than a brief emotional hurt.
The claim seems weaker, on the other hand, when one party
has sacrificed a career in order to assist the other party's
career and then years later, after achieving success, the
other wants out and would leave the sacrificing party
destitute. At a minimum, the sacrificing party would seem
to have a strong claim for a right to receive support from
the party wanting out of the relationship.
Now let us assume that there is no agreement not to
terminate -- that the parties have voluntarily entered into a
relationship without specifying whether there is a right of
unilateral termination or not -- and that now one party
wants out, whereas the other wants the relationship to
continue. Again, it must be decided which side's interests
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are weightier in context. Compare two situations: first, two
parties establish a friendship, and later one party wants to
end it while the other wants it to continue; second, two
parties mutually undertake some joint economic venture,
and later one party wants out. In American society, the
right to unilaterally terminate a friendship is the norm,
whereas measures are sometimes taken to induce the
continued existence of business relationships, or at least to

require comlensation in the event of unilateral
termination.

56

For example, although courts have been unwilling to compel

performance of personal service contracts, they will at times enjoin
breaching parties such as entertainers and others with unique skills
from working for competitors. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §367 (1981); William L. Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal
Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in High Technology Industries,
17 LAB. LAW. 25, 33-34(2001). Similarly, express and, at times,
implied non-competition clauses and covenants not to disclose between
employer and employee or in professional associations are enforced.
This enforcement is subject to a reasonableness test that depends on
whether there exists a legitimate protectable interest such as trade
secrets or money invested in training, or whether the purpose is simply
to tie someone to the firm or the effect is to overly undermine mobility.
See, e.g., Rachael S. AmowRichmon, Bargainingfor Loyalty in the
Information Age: A Reconsiderationof the Role of Substantive
Fairnessin Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REv. 1163
(2001); Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training,and
the Limits of Transaction-CostAnalysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49 (2001); Suellen
Lowry, Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes:Dissolutionsof
ConcurrentPropertyInterests, 40 STAN. L. REV. 519 (1988); Stewart
E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation ofHuman Capital,79 VA. L. REV.
383 (1993); Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over
the Ownership of Human Capitalin the ChangingWorkplace, 34
CONN. L. REv. 721 (2002); Sela Stroud, Non-Compete Agreements:
Weighing the Interests ofProfession and Firm, 53 ALA. L. REv. 1023
(2002). When successful, such actions, although not specifically
requiring the continuation of a business relationship, may induce its
continuance by preventing people who want out from establishing
alternative relationships.
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The two situations cannot readily be distinguished
on the notion that a friendship is inherently terminable at
any party's will because it depends on an emotional
commitment that cannot be imposed. In fact, by forcing
people to associate, it may well be possible to induce
emotional commitments that one or both parties would
otherwise reject, as with the bonds that develop among
soldiers drafted into military service or workers brought
together in the workplace5 7 Moreover, a successful
business relationship also requires a type of emotional
commitment among its associates, a commitment that is in
many ways as intimate as that of a friendship. 58 Nor can
the situations readily be distinguished by the contractual
nature of the economic venture, or by the reliance and
opportunity costs associated with it. A friendship too is a
type of agreement. Although ordinarily more tacit,
perhaps, than the usual business relationship, friendships
typically entail a mutual commitment to respond to the
other when asked and when able to do so. In reliance on
that commitment, and to one's detriment if the commitment

57 See, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How
WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 3-29, 69-83
(2003); GERALD F. LINDERMAN, THE WORLD WITHIN WAR:
AMERICA'S COMBAT EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR 11263-99 (1997);
JOHN C. MCMANUS, THE DEADLY BROTHERHOOD 244-46,273-90

Q1998).
8 See, e.g., DON COHEN & LAURENCE PRUSAK, IN GOOD COMPANY:
How SOCIAL CAPITAL MAKES ORGANIZATIONS WORK 4 (2001)
(emphasizing the importance to an organization's success of "the trust,

mutual understanding, and shared values and behaviors that bind the
members of human networks and communities and make cooperative
action possible"); W. EDWARDS DEMING, THE NEw ECONOMICS FOR
INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT, EDUCATION 28-29 (2d ed. 2000)

(emphasizing the importance to an enterprise's success of"giv[ing]
everyone a chance to take pride in his work," "informal dialogue,"
"comradeship," "study-groups and social gatherings," and generally
developing a spirit of cooperation).
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is withdrawn, friends frequently change position and pass
up other opportunities.
Perhaps collective considerations distinguish
friendship from business, like the centrality of business
relations to the materialistic ethic that prevails in American
society and the perceived dependence upon binding
contracts for the successful functioning of the economic
system. Absent such considerations, attempts to impose
intimate relations like friendships might be thought to
offend human dignity. Yet, a society is certainly
conceivable in which friendship is perceived as so integral
to its success that the unilateral termination of friendships,

at least without good cause, is discouraged.5 9 Even in this

highly individualistic society, people are discouraged
through social pressure from cavalierly ending friendships
unilaterally, such as a bad reputation that makes it difficult
to establish friendships in the future.

B. Establishingan Initial Relationship
59 See, e.g., Joan G. Miller et al., Perceptionsof Social Responsibilities
in India and in the United States: Moral Imperatives or Personal
Decisions, 5 8 J. OF P ERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 33 (1990) (finding
that Indians tend to view responsibilities to others, especially to friends
and strangers, more in terms of moral obligations, whereas Americans
tend to view them as more a matter of personal choice); Niloufer Q.
Madhi, Pukhtunuali: Ostracism and HonorAmong the Pathan Hill
Tribes, 7(3/4) ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 295 (1986) (reporting on
the practice of ostracism, including expulsion from the tribe, as a means
of deterring behavior contrary to tribal norms and of unifying the
group); Paras N. Singh et al., A ComparativeStudy of Selected
Attitudes, Values, and PersonalityCharacteristicsofAmerican,
Chinese, and Indian Students, 57 J. OF Soc. PSYCHOL 123, 130 (1962)
("The American culture gives more emphasis to personal autonomy and
individuality. In contrast to this, Indian and Chinese students give
more emphasis to sympathy, love, affection, mutual help and family
bonding, resulting in sympathetic and sacrificing attitudes.").
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Thus far the analysis has been skeptical of the right
of a party not wanting an association to control the outcome
in all instances, at least with regard to an already existing
relationship.
Now, let us turn to the inception of three
hypothetical proposed associations: one both parties want
but which others find objectionable; one that one party
wants and the other does not; and one that neither party
wants while others do.
1. Relationships Both PartiesWant
When both parties want to have a relationship in a
society favoring the individual right of free association,
preventing them from doing so would seem clearly to
violate their rights, absent overriding collective
considerations. Examples of such collective considerations
are laws prohibiting conspiracies to overthrow the
government or in restraint of trade. In other instances,
however, assertions of collective considerations may not
suffice to overcome the value of free association.
Consider the practice of forced separation of the
races, as with mandatory segregation in the United States
and South African apartheid, and as still practiced in some
societies today. 60 Through the use of governmental power,
See, e.g., YAAKOv KoP & ROBERT E. LITAN, STICKING TOGETHER:
THE ISRAELI EXPERIMENT IN PLURALISM 20-21, 30-34,74-75, 86, 98
(2002) (discussing various government practices promoting the
segregation of Arab Israelis and their separation from mainstream life
and characterizing the situation as "separate but not equal"); BRENDAN
60

MURTAGH, THE POLITICS OF TERRITORY: POLICY AND SEGREGATION IN

NORTHERN IRELAND 34-43, 46-49, 151, 163-67 (2002) (detailing

extensive segregation in Northern Ireland along religious lines, but
finding, despite the use of peace lines in Belfast to separate religious
enclaves so as to avoid conflict, a lack of evidence to support the use of
planning instruments to achieve ethno-political objectives and
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forced separation imposes the preference of those who do
not want interethnic relationships on those who do. In the
United States, for example, anti-miscegenation laws and
laws mandating school and residential segregation
prevented those blacks and whites who wanted to marry, or
go to school, or live together, from choosing to have those
associations. 61
characterizing goxernment policy more as one of "benign acceptance"
of separation than of design); Tracy Wilkinson, Bosnia'sEthnic
Division Relocates to the Classroom,L.A. TIMES, October 19, 1997, at
Al (reporting on the segregation of students in schools in the MuslimCroat Federation with "separate-but-equal" programs for Bosniak
Muslim and Roman Catholic Croatian children).
61 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (prohibition against
interracial marriage constitutes invidious discrimination based on race
with respect to a fundamental individual liberty and therefore violates
Equal Protection Clause); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
(city ordinance prohibiting both blacks and whites from living in
neighborhoods where other race is in the majority violates Equal
Protection Clause); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927) (per curiam)
(city ordinance prohibiting both blacks and whites from living in
neighborhoods where other race is in the majority, except with consent
of majority of other race, violates Equal Protection Clause); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants in deeds constitutes discriminatory state action in violation
of Equal Protection Clause); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (mandatory segregation of the races in public schools violates
Equal Protection Clause). Compare Herbert Wechsler, TowardNeutral
Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959)
(viewing the issue posed by enforced segregation as one of "denying
the association to those individuals who wish it and imposing it on
those who would avoid it," and opining that there is no neutral
constitutional basis for favoring one claim over the other); ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 57 (2d ed., 1986) (replying to Wechsler:
What, on the score of generality and neutrality, is wrong
with the principle that a legislative choice in favor of a
freedom not to associate is forbidden, when the
consequence of such a choice is to place one of the groups
of which our society is constituted in a position of
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In support of laws against race mixing, the right of
groups to preserve their ethnic purity might be asserted.
Evaluating the merit of the ethnic purity argument
ultimately demands a value judgment about which there
may be disagreement. To some, the pursuit of ethnic purity
amounts to racism, whereas to believers it represents ethnic
pride and group solidarity. 62 In the United States today,
judging the worth of people on the basis of race is generally
perceived as wrong and as contrary to society's ethos that
people are to be judged on their individual merits, such as
their character and actions, 63 and especially so when the
government makes invidious race distinctions. 64 While in
permanent, humiliating inferiority .... )
62 Racism may take different forms, and what racism consists of is
contestable. A helpful way to conceptualize racism is to view it on a
continuum. On an individual level, the continuum might range from
overt bigotry to unconscious bias. See, eg., Taunya Lovell Banks,
Exploring White Resistance to Racial Reconciliation in the United
States, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 903, 949-50 (2003); Charles R. Lawrence,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning With Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). On a societal level it might
range from laws explicitly discriminating on the basis of race to
institutional racism in the form of facially colorblind structures and
practices that perpetuate racial inequalities deriving from past explicit
discrimination. See, e.g., JOE R. FEAGIN & CLAIRECE BOOKER FEAGIN,
DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE: INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND

SExISM (1978); Ian F. Haney Lopez, InstitutionalRacism: Judicial
Conduct and a New Theory ofRacial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J.
1721, 1806-11, 1822-30 (2000).
63 As most eloquently expressed by Martin Luther King, Jr.
in his "I
Have A Dream" speech: "I have a dream that my four children will one
day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their
skin but by the content of their character." MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.,
ACALL TO CONSCIENCE THE LANDMARK SPEECHES OF DR. MARTIN

LUTHER KING, JR. (Claybome Carson & Kris Shepard eds., 2001).
64 See Loving, supra note 61. The debate over the permissibility
of
affirmative action, see infra note 68, ultimately turns on one's view of
whether all race distinctions are inherently, or at least presumptively,
invidious in that affirmative action amounts to impermissible
discrimination against whites by denying them benefits based on race
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keeping with the society's individualistic ethic people may
be entitled to their personal prejudices and even to practice
them to some extent, they are not to use the government as
a means of imposing their views and practices on society as
a whole. Thus, if some community were to attempt to
reinstate the forced separation of the races for the purpose
of preserving ethnic purity, even if supported by a majority
of both blacks and whites, that would be unacceptable
today because it clearly violates society's prevailing mores.
Nevertheless, a society is conceivable, and some may exist
today, in which the preservation of the group is seen as
more important than the rights of individual members.
rather than judging them on their merits, or whether race distinctions
are more permissible when the purpose is benign and seeks to eradicate
the effects of racial oppression. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (affirmative action in granting of
government contracts must be judged under strict scrutiny standard);
Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
("In my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest' in
discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial
discrimination in the opposite direction."); Id. at 241 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("[G]overnmentsponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as
noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice... ."); Id. at
243 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is no moral or constitutional
equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste
system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination.").
65This sentiment was reflected in the past generation in an
intensification of ethnic conflict and an increased division of groups o f
people along ethnic lines in several parts of the world. Examples
include the partition of colonial India into largely Hindu India and
largely Muslim Pakistan, the creation of Israel as a religious state
primarily for Jews and the resultant struggle for the establishment of a
Palestinian state, the civil war in Lebanon between Arab Christians and
Muslims, the Hutu genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, and the break-up
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia into more ethnically homogeneous
states. See, e.g., SUZANNE M. BIRGERSON, AFTER THE BREAKUP OF A
MuLTI-ETHNIC EMPIRE: RUSSIA, SUCCESSOR STATES, AND EURASIAN
SECURITY (2002); NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY
(1994); GtRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 1959-1994: HISTORY
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2. Relationships One Party Wants
Now, let us examine the appropriateness, in a
society that generally favors free choice, of forcing on an
unwanting party an association another party wants. 66 As
OF A GENOCIDE (1995); EDWARD W. SAID, THE POLITICS OF
DISPOSSESSION: THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINIAN SELFDETERMINATION, 1969-1994 (1994); KAMAL SALIBI, AHOUSE OF
MANY MANSIONS: THE HISTORY OF LEBANON RECONSIDERED (1988);
IAN TALBOT, INDIA AND PAKISTAN (2000); YUGOSLAVIA AND AFTER
A STUDY IN FRAGMENTATION, DESPAIR AND REBIRTH 87-115, 138-54,

196-212,232-47 (David A. Dyker & Ivan Vejvoda eds., 1996). In
many of these areas the now-divided groups, while maintaining ethnic
identity and varying degrees of insularity, intermingled and interacted
for many years in relative harmony. Various historical factors, not all
yet fully examined, may have contributed to the recent ethnic division.
For example, historical ethnic identification and nationalism; the
exploitation of ethnic differences for their o wn ends by colonial powers
or indigenous actors; the imposition of nation states from without rather
than spontaneous development from within; the collapse of or failure to
develop unifying structures; population growth and scarcity of
resources; and the uneven development of and increasing disparities
among and within various regions of the world. That the entire
situation may be socially constructed does not make the ethnic
divisions and the emphasis on the group any less real, just less endemic
and more readily subject to change under different - more humane social conditions.
66 Here the obverse of the four alternatives discussed above,
see supra
note 50, would be first, to allow the party wanting a relationship to
impose it on the unwanting party; second, to allow the relationship to
be imposed but require the party wanting the relationship to
compensate the unwanting party; third, to allow the unwanting party to
avoid the relationship but require compensation to the party wanting
the relationship; and fourth, to allow the unwanting party to avoid the
relationship entirely. Only the last alternative fully favors the party not
wanting the relationship, whereas the first three all concede something
to the party wanting the relationship. Even the third alternative, which
of the first three is least favorable to the party wanting the relationship,
imposes a relationship on the unwanting party since requiring the
unwanting party to compensate the other party is in itself a type of
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with already existing relationships, one problem with the
initiation of a relationship when the parties are not in
agreement is parallel individual rights claims. Allowing
someone to impose a relationship impinges on the freedom
of the party not wanting it, whereas enabling the party not
wanting a relationship to avoid it impacts the freedom of
the party wanting the relationship. So again, a balancing of
interests is required. But here, the detrimental reliance
argument of the party wanting in is unavailing, since it
turns on the existence of an agreement that induces the
reliance. Thus, the individual right claim of a party
involved in a long-term marriage, that the other party
should not be able to unilaterally terminate the relationship,
seems stronger than the claim that a party wanting in
should be able to force an unwanted marriage on another
party in the first instance.
In other contexts, however, there may be sufficient
reasons for empowering one party to initiate an unwanted
relationship with another. To illustrate, let us revert to the
race relations example and examine possible scenarios once
the mandatory separation of the races has been outlawed.
Let us first assume that whites prefer segregation while
blacks prefer integration, or, in other words, that blacks
want a relationship that whites do not.67 One context might
relationship. And it is inconsistent with an absolute privilege to avoid
an unwanted relationship since having to compensate strengthens the
bargaining position of the party wanting in and may induce the
unwanting party to establish a relationship that would otherwise not

come about.
67 A divergence of opinion exists between the black and white
communities over the desirability of integration versus separation. See
infra notes 95, 98, and 102. Historically, the leadership of the black

community has also been diverse, with some like Martin Luther King,
Jr. and Thurgood Marshall pushing for integration, while others like

Marcus Garvey and Malcolm X were more nationalistic. See, e.g.,
ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1995); MODERN
BLACK NATIONALISM: FROM MARCUS GARVEY TO Louis FARRAKHAN

32

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1]

101

be the desire of blacks for access to public employment or
colleges previously reserved for whites. Integration might
come about once public institutions begin to operate on a
color blind basis and apply the same hiring and admissions
criteria to both blacks and whites. 68
One response to whites who object to integration in
this context is that the relationship is not forced since they
have willingly entered into it by accepting public
employment or by choosing to attend public colleges. But
since public institutions may, as a practical matter, be the
only viable options for many people, there is a sense in
which the relationship is less than fully voluntary. A
stronger response, even acknowledging a degree of forced
association, is that to satisfy white preferences for non(William L. Van Deburged. 1997); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD
MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY(1998).

68 Achieving integration in public institutions may, on the other hand,
require affirmative action that sets aside positions for blacks, or at least
takes race into account in ways that promote integration. See Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)(public law school may consider race or
ethnicity as a factor in admissions process per compelling interest in
attaining diverse student body provided it does not set aside slots or
establish quotas for minority applicants and employs the same general
standards for all applicants); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(public university's consideration of race in admissions process not
narrowly tailored to achieve compelling interest in diversity where all
minority candidates received a bonus without making individualized
determination of merit and per effect of bonus in making race the
decisive factor such that amounts to virtual set-aside). See also supra
note 64. One possible justification for affirmative action in this context
is that without it, the advantage that whites have as a result of past
racism that failed to judge blacks on their merits would become
entrenched. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). Another justification is that merely
prohibiting discrimination against blacks is insufficient in practice to
assure judgments based on merit because the lingering racism of the
past is difficult to prove and often operates on a subconscious or
unconscious level, even when people think they are and may appear to
be judging based on merit. See Lawrence, supra note 62.
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integration would require the government to reinstate
mandatory segregation in violation of its obligation to treat
people as equals and not to discriminate against them on
the basis of race.
Moving from the public to the private arena, assume
that various entities (schools, clubs, professional
associations, political parties, housing, public
accommodations, and the like) are discriminating against
blacks in accordance with the preferences of their white
clientele. Assume further that laws are proposed to ban
those practices, and that whites object that such laws would
violate their freedom of association by forcing them to
associate with blacks. They might assert that in a society
valuing individual freedom, people must be allowed the
latitude to hold and practice beliefs that may be offensive to
others, as long as they function in the private spheres of
social life and do not attempt to use the power of
government to impose their beliefs on others. As strong as
these claims may be in the abstract, in context there are
strong individual rights considerations to the contrary.
First, the equal freedom argument is strongest
when, in practice, there is genuine mutuality. It becomes
weaker when mutuality is absent and the exercise of
freedoms by some adversely affects the exercise of
freedoms by others. For example, the mutuality argument
seems quite strong with regard to people's sexual
preferences, particularly when they are practiced in the
privacy of one's home so that others are not forcibly
exposed to them and remain free to similarly pursue their
own sexual preferences. 69 The mutuality argument

69 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (state statute
criminalizing sexual conduct between persons of the same sex violates
rights of liberty and privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
Lawrence overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(sodomy statute as applied to consensual sex between gay men in
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collapses, however, in a society where whites control the
means of achieving success and use that control to maintain
their dominance by denying access to others. Against the
individual freedom to choose with whom to associate must
be counterbalanced the value of the individual right to
equal opportunity, which may at times outweigh
associational considerations. 70
Second, the free association argument is stronger in
the private context and weaker in the public context. The
free association claim asserts the right to do in private that
which the government itself could not legitimately do or
mandate. A society with a strong individualistic ethic
requires a distinction between the public and the private
spheres of social life because if everything were viewed as
public, little or nothing of individual freedom remains. 71
bedroom of home does not violate fundamental right of privacy).
Compare id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting):
This case involves no real interference with the rights of
others, for the mere knowledge that other individuals do
not adhere to one's value system cannot be a legally
cognizable interest,.., let alone an interest that can
justify invading the houses, hearts, and minds of
citizens who choose to live their lives differently.
70 See Brown, supra note 61, at 493:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.
71 See Kleven, supra note 29, at 20-2 1:
[A] democratic society in which people have no
rights as individuals and groups, but only as members
of society at large.... would be an undesirable state
of affairs ... because individuals and groups do have
legitimate interests which any society worthy of
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The distinction between the public and the private
is, however, often blurred. For example, white dominance
in the nominally private sphere of social life is to a great
extent a byproduct of past racist action on the part of the
government. 72 Furthermore, when racist practices in the
nominally private sphere of social life become widespread,
they take on a public character. There is little practical
difference, for instance, between a law prohibiting blacks
from living in white neighborhoods and the widespread
practice of whites refusing to sell or rent to blacks. 73
being called democratic must recognize and accord.
See also Robert H. Mnookin, The Public/PrivateDichotomy: Political
Disagreementand Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L.REv. 1429
(1982) (discussing the distinction between public and private spheres as
a means of identifying when government regulation is and is not
justified, and academic critiques of the meaningfulness of the
distinction).
72 See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundariesof Race: Political
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1841, 1849-57,186078 (1994) (arguing that "even in the absence of racism, race-neutral
policy could be expected to entrench segregation and socio -economic
stratification in a society with a history of racism," (at 1852)); Harris,
supra note 68, at 1715 -21,1737-57 (discussing slavery, segregation,
and the racialization of the law in general in the United States);
KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER THE SUBURBANIZATION

OF THE UNITED STATES 195-203, 207-218, 225-30 (1985) (discussing
"redlining" black and poorer neighborhoods following World War II);
DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL BLACK AMERICANS AND

THE US FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1995) (detailing the history of the
U.S. government's involvement in fostering segregation of its workers
and in federal programs through the mid 2 0 th century, which "could not
help but define in part the character of the American polity and ensure
unequal treatment for Black American employees," (at 16)).
13 Compare Buchanan and Harmon,supra note 61 (struck down city
ordinances mandating racially separate neighborhoods) and Shelley,
supra note 61 (invalidated judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants). Racially restrictive covenants are still a valid means of
maintaining neighborhoods' ethnic purity, so long as they are
informally adhered to and there is no outright refusal to sell to someone
on account of race. See id., at 13 ("So long as the purposes of [the
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The balance between the individualistic values of
free association, non-discrimination and equal opportunity
depends on context and scope. To illustrate, let's compare
race and religion. The freedom to practice one's religion is
constitutionally protected in the United States because of
the centrality of religious beliefs to people's world views,
and because, historically, societies' dominant religions
have used governmental power to oppress minorities and
advance a single view.74 Such domination is inconsistent
with all of the values discussed above. Therefore, the
purpose of protecting free exercise is to assure all religious
groups an equal opportunity to associate freely and without
discrimination, even though some of their beliefs and
practices may be quite reprehensible to others.75
Furthermore, to ensure the government's neutrality
toward differing religious and other world views, it may
neither promote one religion over others nor religion in

restrictive] agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their
terms, it would appear clear that there was no action by the State and
the provisions of the [Fourteenth] Amendment were not violated.").
See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (Civil
Rights Act of 1866 bars private discrimination based on race in the sale
or rental of property).
74 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-18
(2002)
(Justice Breyer's dissent from Court's decision upholding parents' use
of government-funded school vouchers to enroll children in religious
schools).
75 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free exercise
rights of Amish entitle parents to remove their children from school
after eighth grade without violating state's compulsory attendance law).
But compare Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994) (violates Establishment Clause for state to create special school
district for religious group, overriding religion's free exercise claims);
Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1208 (D.Or. 1984)
(violates Establishment Clause for state to allow incorporation of city
completely controlled by religious organization, overriding religion's
free exercise claims).

37

106 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1]

general. 76 However, this separation between church and
state does not prevent government, in order to promote the
common good, from intervening in religious affairs when a
religious practice contravenes important secular values 77 or
from incidentally benefiting religion in the furtherance of
legitimate secular objectives. 78 Thus, the overall picture is
of a society where people in their private spheres of
association enjoy a relative autonomy, which fluctuates as
their private actions are perceived as more or less of public
moment.
Analogously in the racial context, on the one hand
we have whites who prefer to be with whites asserting the
right to associate so as to practice beliefs that others find
objectionable and to exclude blacks in order to do so, much
like a religious group might confine membership to
believers. On the other hand, we have the fundamental
76

See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (statute

forbidding teaching of evolution unless accompanied by creationism
violates Establishment Clause per purpose of promoting particular
religious belief); Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924 (1984) (statute
authorizing period of silence in public schools for meditation or
voluntary prayer impermissibly endorses religion in violation of
Establishment Clause); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963) (statute requiring Bible reading at beginning of school day
violates Establishment Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
lstate prescribed non-sectarian prayer violates Establishment Clause).
See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (denial of unemployment benefits due to
termination for the use of peyote, a prohibited controlled substance,
does not violate free exercise rights of Native Americans who use
peyote in religious rituals); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) (upholding against free exercise claim prosecution of parent for
violation of child labor laws for the use of child to distribute and sell
religious literature).
78 See, e.g. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (state
provision of educational vouchers used by parents to enroll children in
religious schools does not violate Establishment Clause per secular
purpose of improving educational opportunities and freedom of parents
to select schools of their choice).
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secular value that people should not be discriminated
against on account of race. This value is as central to
people's humanity as is the sanctity of their religious
beliefs, and the need to protect it also arises from a history
of oppression. If society is to accommodate both of these
fundamental individual interests, then racial exclusivity can
only be acceptable the narrower and more private its scope
and is less acceptable the more it spills into the public arena
and perpetuates historical oppression. Thus, for example,
the case for racial exclusivity is far weaker for a political
party or professional association than for a genuinely
private club, 79 and is stronger when the preference is
mutual and leaves avenues for those who prefer integration
than when it undermines equal opportunity. 80
79 Compare Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (nominally private

white voters' association's pre-primary selection of candidates, where
primary and general elections ratify those selections, violates Fifteenth
Amendment's prohibition against state abridgement of the right to vote
on account of race per state entanglement in process) and Smith v.
Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (exclusion of blacks from Democratic
Party's primary elections violates the Fifteenth Amendment), with
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (no state action in
violation of Equal Protection Clause regarding the granting of a liquor
license to private club that excludes blacks).
80 A balancing test that takes into account the extent to which assertions
of free association, if protected, would perpetuate historical oppression
or undermine equal opportunity, as against the extent of the impact on
associational interests of requiring unwanted associations, might help
explain the divergent results in a series of Supreme Court cases dealing
with exclusion based on race, gender and sexual orientation. Compare
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (application of federal nondiscrimination statute to prohibit private, commercially operated, nonsectarian school from denying admission based on race does not violate
free association rights of school or parents) and Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 1 (1984) (state requirement that Jaycees admit
women does not violate male members' freedom of association); with
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S.
557 (1995) (application of state public accommodations law prohibiting
discrimination on basis of sexual orientation so as to bar organizers of
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To illustrate this point further, suppose that in the
name of promoting ethnic identity, people of a common
ethnic heritage congregate in a particular locale, and even
take steps to preserve the ethnic character of the area and
prevent outsiders from living there. 81 Consider two
scenarios. In the first, while some people separate along
ethnic lines others do not, such that there are ample
communities available for people preferring ethnic
homogeneity and for those preferring diversity. In the
second, the vast majority of the major ethnic group in a
society separate themselves, leaving those in the minority
who prefer diversity no choice but to live in a minority
community.
The first scenario seems less problematic than the
second. In the first, some people may be deprived of the
opportunity to enter some communities due to their
ethnicity; for instance, people who disapprove of voluntary
segregation and want into communities of a different
ethnicity in order to promote integration. Yet, there are still
available integrated communities that meet their
associational preferences, whereas empowering them to
force their way into the separate communities would
St. Patrick's Day parade from disallowing Group to march as a group
and to carry banner stating its purpose, although allowing members of
Group to participate as individuals, violates organizers First
Amendment right of expressive association by requiring inclusion of
disfavored message) and Boy Scouts of AmL v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000) (application of state law to prohibit Boy Scouts from expelling
scout master who publicly declared his homosexuality violates First
Amendment right of expressive association). Does the diversity of the
results reflect less sensitivity to the interests of gays than of women and
ethnic minorities?
81 One approach might be the use of restrictive covenants limiting
residency to members of that ethnic group, see Shelley, supra notes 61,
73; another might be the acquisition of a large tract of land to be
collectively owned and occupied by an organization whose
membership is limited to that ethnic group, see City ofRaneeshpuram,
supra note 75.
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undermine the associational preferences of those living
there. In the second scenario, on the other hand, the
associational preferences of most or all of the major ethnic
group are met while the preferences of many minorities are
not. By virtue of being deprived of the opportunity to
associate with the majority, minorities may also be
deprived of comparable life chances because, say, there is
more money and therefore better education in majority
communities, or because the majority have access in their
communities to information and contacts that are
unavailable in minority communities and are integral to
success in life.82 If so, that would contribute to the
majority's perpetual dominance within the society as a
whole, and thus strengthen the minority claim for being
empowered to force an unwanted relationship on the
majority.
3. Relationships Neither Party Wants
Finally, let us consider proposed associations that
none of the parties want. As with associations that both
parties want, in a society generally favoring free choice, the
presumption would ordinarily be that the parties control
when they are in agreement, unless there are overriding
collective considerations. To illustrate, let's continue with
the example of race relations and examine the
appropriateness of imposing integration on blacks and
whites when neither want it and both prefer separation.
Suppose that, following mandatory segregation,
race-conscious desegregation plans --including such
measures as forced busing--are proposed for the purpose of
82

See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) ("The law school,

the proving ground for legal training and practice, cannot be effective
in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law
interacts").
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promoting public school integration. 3 Suppose that both
black and white parents oppose the plans, and prefer a
freedom of choice approach that would enable parents to
select the schools their children attend. Further suppose
that, if implemented, the freedom of choice approach would
result in substantially segregated schools.84
Both black and white parents might argue for
freedom of choice on grounds of free association, so that
everyone can decide for themselves with whom to attend
school. They might also assert that just as mandatory
segregation violates people's rights by preventing
associations they want, conversely, so do integration plans
that force people to associate who do not want to associate
with each other.85
83 See Swann v. Charlotte Mechlenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. I
(1971) (upholding forced busing as desegregation remedy in formerly
de jure segregated system).
84 See Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)
(overthrowing freedom of choice desegregation plan in formerly de jure
segregated system containing only two schools where all whites and
85% of blacks chose to attend former segregated schools).
85 People may be forced together under non-race-conscious as well
as
race-conscious desegregation plans. For example, rather than freedom
of choice or forced busing, a neighborhood school approach might be
implemented and might force people who do not want to associate for
racial or other reasons to be together. Indeed, where education is
compulsory, even freedom of choice may force some to attend schools
with others with whom they don't want to associate. However, a raceneutral neighborhood school approach that forces unwanting parties
together might be thought preferable to a freedom of choice plan likely
to result in a dispersal of students throughout a school district in that
neighborhood schools enable greater parental involvement and expend
less time and money on transportation, all of which may produce better
educational outcomes. Assuming that individual rights claims do not
always on principle trump collective considerations, relevant questions
might be whether the evidence really supports the asserted collective
concerns (bearing in mind that at times collective considerations are
speculative and may require a period of experimentation to see if in fact
they pan out), and whether some types of collective considerations are
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One possible response is that a major purpose of
public education is to help build a cohesive society through
the development of widely shared basic values, like
tolerance and understanding, which promote the
cooperative behavior necessary for society to thrive as well
as the respect for others that a society valuing individual
freedom demands. 86 So it might be claimed that society is
better off in the long run when people are forced to
integrate against their wishes because forced integration
reduces racial prejudice, thereby reducing the social turmoil
that would otherwise occur and enhancing productivity
through a greater willingness of racially diverse people to
work cooperatively together.
A second response has to do with the way in which
preferences are formed. Considered from the perspective
of the current moment, it does appear that forced
integration negates the preferences of those who prefer
separation. But preferences develop over time, are the
result of exposure and conditioning, can change over time
and under different conditions, and might well be different
on principle weightier than others when balanced against individual
rights claims. For example, when stacked up against the freedom to
associate, the benefits to society of reduced racial prejudice or of better
educational performance might be thought weightier than efficiency
considerations such as increased costs, although at some level the cost
of protecting some individual rights might impinge on the ability to
Promote others or might become prohibitive as a practical matter.
See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 94-116 (1926)
(developing "a democratic conception of education"); AMY GUTMAN,
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 41-47 (1987) (discussing and favoring a
"democratic state of education" where "all citizens must be educated so
as to have a chance to share in self-consciously shaping the structure of
their society," and that to accomplish this end must "aid children in
developing the capacity to understand and to evaluate competing
conceptions of the good life and the good society," and must "use
education to inculcate those character traits, such as honesty, religious
toleration, and mutual respect for persons, that serve as foundations for
rational deliberation of differing ways of life").
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in the present had past exposure and conditioning been
otherwise. 87 Thus, the current separatist preferences of
both blacks and whites might be the by-product of a history
of past racism and of government participation therein, and
the very same people who currently prefer separation might
prefer integration had history been otherwise. In a sense,
then, current separatist preferences may be imposed rather
than freely chosen, or at least so highly conditioned as to be
virtually involuntary. It could be argued, then, that a period
of forced integration is needed in order to counteract past
conditioning and put people in a position to more freely
choose whether to integrate or separate. 8 Considered from
87

See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF

THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE 468 (Richard Nice, trans., 1984) (a study of
how social life conditions people's tastes):
The cognitive structures which social agents implement in
the practical knowledge of the social world are
internalized, 'embodied' social structures. The practical
knowledge of the social world that is presupposed by
'reasonable' behavior within it implements classificatory
schemes..., historical schemes of perception and
appreciation which are the product of the objective
division into classes (age groups, genders, social classes)
and which function below the level of consciousness and
discourse.
88 See, e.g., GROUPS IN CONTACT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF

DESEGREGATION (Norman Miller & Marjorie B. Brewer, eds. 1984)
(containing studies in various societies and contexts of the conditions
under which the "contact hypothesis," which posits that "one's
behavior and attitudes toward members of a disliked social category
will become more positive after direct interpersonal interaction with
them," (at 2), holds true; identifying such factors as contact under
egalitarian circumstances that minimize preexisting status differentials
and enable cooperative behavior involving mutual interdependence and
intimate interpersonal associations; but noting the absence of studies of
the carryover of improved inter-ethnic relations in structured
environments like schools to everyday life); Note, Lessons in
Transcendence: ForcedAssociations and the Military, 117 HARv. L.
REv. 1981, 1981 (2004) (arguing that forced racial association in the
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this more long-term perspective, forced integration does not
derogate from, but actually promotes, freedom of
association.
This point is particularly significant in the case of
young children who may be thought not yet capable of
freely choosing with whom to associate or not, and who,
due to their tender age, may be especially susceptible to
conditioning by their parents. This poses a possible
conflict between the individual rights of children and of
parents, and raises the question of whether parents have the
individual right to raise their children as they see fit even
though to do so derogates from their children's individual
rights. 89 An associational issue is at stake here because the
claimed parental prerogative to control children's
upbringing asserts the right to impose on children a
relationship the child might not choose to have if the child
were in a position to decide.
In response, it might be asserted that while some
degree of parental prerogatives exist on individual rights
grounds, society as a whole may intervene in the parentchild relationship so as to protect the individual rights of
children as against parents. 90 Alternatively, it might be
military has made it "the most successfully racially integrated
institution in American society... with lasting effects on the individuals
who pass through it").
89 See Casey, supra note 49, at 899-900 (parental consent requirement
for abortion by minor child valid provided accompanied by by-pass
procedure enabling minor to obtain abortion upon judicial
determination that minor is mature enough to give consent or that
abortion would be in her best interests).
90 For example, while the fundamental right to raise their children
entitles parents to educate their children in private school as against
state requirement to enroll them in public school, Piercev. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), it is implicit in Pierce that compulsory
education laws are valid and that the state may compel parents to
educate their children in order to protect their best interests. See also
Prince,supra note 77 (holding that parental prerogatives and free
exercise of religion do not entitle parents to violate child labor laws).
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asserted that society as a whole has a collective interest in
raising children that is as strong as, or stronger than, the
parental prerogative claim. Consequently, society has the
right to intervene in, or supplant entirely, the parental
upbringing of children when intervention serves the
common good. 9'
Therefore, the fact that children are involved may
strengthen the argument for the forced integration of
schools. First, since children may not yet be in a position
to freely choose with whom to associate, the collective
interest in conditioning children to prefer integration may
outweigh the parental interest in conditioning them to
prefer segregation. Second, society as a whole may have a
legitimate interest, as a surrogate for children, in protecting
their right to receive an adequately balanced education so
that they can more freely choose whether to factor race into
their associational preferences as adults. 92
Again, a contextual analysis is necessary in order to
fully evaluate the strength of these competing
considerations. In the real world, not only may current
preferences be culturally conditioned, but blacks and whites
supra note 86, at 22-28 (considering and
ultimately rejecting the "family state" model of education whose
"defining feature... is that it claims exclusive educational authority as a
means of establishing a harmony - one might say, a constitutive relation
91Compare, e.g.,

GUTMAN,

- between individual and social good based on knowledge,"); PAULA
53-55,

RAYMON, THE KIBBUTZ COMMUNITY AND NATION BUILDING

233-36 (1981) (discussing the communal living arrangements of
children in Israeli kibbutzim as based on the "socialist principle that the
community should replace the family" and the tension this caused for
mothers who desired a more family oriented approach to child-rearing).
92 See, e.g., GUTMAN, supra note 86; Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of
Mobile County, 827 F.2d 684, 692 (11 th Cir. 1987) (rejecting parental
challenge to public school texts as teaching "religion of Humanism" in
violation of Establishment Clause per the state's "indisputably non
religious purpose.. .to instill in.. .public school children such values as
independent thought, tolerance of diverse views, self-respect, maturity,
self-reliance and logical decision making").
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may be on unequal footing in asserting and realizing their
preferences. For example, in some circumstances blacks
may prefer integration but opt for separation due to social
pressure from whites who control their access to a
livelihood or whose outright hostility to integration poses
risks of physical or emotional harm. 93 In addition, blacks
who prefer integration may choose separation because so
many whites opt for separation that integrated settings are
unavailable, inaccessibly located, or prohibitively
expensive. 94 Where either situation occurs, not only does it

strengthen the arguments for forced integration just
advanced, but it also implicates those raised in the

93 See, e.g., ROBERT L. CRAIN, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL

(1968) (a study of school desegregation in 15 cities,
some of which experienced resistance as hostile as mob violence and
others a more cooperative response, and generally concluding that
extent of actual conflict was overblown); NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE,
THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA (2001) (reporting that 32% of blacks
polled said they have chosen not to move somewhere because they felt
DESEGREGATION

unwelcome); GARY ORFIELD, HARVARD UNIVERSITY CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT, HOUSING SEGREGATION: CAUSES, EFFECTS, POSSIBLE
CAUSES, at note 25 (2001)at

http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/metro/housing-gary

.php ("Black fears of violence and intimidation in some white
communities are still serious obstacles to housing choice"); R.A.V. v
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (overthrowing as violation of free
speech Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance as applied to burning of cross
on lawn of black family in predominantly white neighborhood).
94 Since whites are still economically better off than blacks, see infra
note 99, they may use their greater wealth to isolate themselves in
communities that are beyond the means of blacks and may use private
deed restrictions or zoning to maintain the price of housing at levels too
high for blacks to afford. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (rejecting race-based equal
protection challenge to denial by suburb of Chicago with over 64,000
residents of whom only 27 were black of rezoning for low cost housing
where center city blacks would likely reside absent showing of
discriminatory intent or purpose).
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discussion of forced integration where whites do not want it
but blacks do.
On the other hand, after a period of
experimentation, the result may be that forced integration
does not improve, but in fact worsens, race relations and
increases individual preferences for educational
separation." Or suppose blacks and whites continue to, or
95 Here the real-world data is mixed and subject to differing
interpretations. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD, HARVARD UNIVERSITY CIVIL
RIGHTS PROJECT, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE CONSEQUENCES OF A

DECADE OF RESEGREGATION 6-7 (2001)
http://civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/SchoolsMore-Sep
arate.pdf (Gallup polls during 1990s showed majority and growing
belief among both blacks and whites that integration improves
education for both groups, while at same time both groups favored
neighborhood schools.); STEVE FARKAS & JEAN JOHNSON, PUB.
AGENDA FOUND., TIME TO MOVE ON: AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND WHITE

PARENTS SET AN AGENDA FOR PUBLIC (1998) (finding that 80% of
black parents and 86% of whites believe improving educational quality
is more important than integration). Measured over time, white support
for the principle that blacks and whites should go to the same schools
has increased substantially over the years, from 1956 when 50%
supported separate schools to 1995 when 96% supported integrated
schools. HOwARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA:
TRENDS AND INTERPRETATION 103 (1997) (reporting on and analyzing
Gallup, National Opinion Research Council, and other attitudinal
polls). When the issue is personalized, there has been a substantial
increase in white willingness to send their children to school with
blacks, although that willingness declines as the numbers change. With
few black students, white willingness has been consistently high over
the years; with half black students, whites were evenly divided in the
late 1950s and early 1960s, but by the 1990s less than 20% voiced
objections; with blacks in the majority, white objection was in the 70%
range in the earlier years, whereas by the mid 1990s whites were about
evenly divided. Id. at 140-41. On the other hand, whites have
generally been unsupportive of forced integration. Whites consistently
answered no more often than yes when asked whether the federal
government should "see to it" that white and black children go to
school together. Whites have consistently opposed forced busing,
although opposition has declined somewhat from over 80% between
the mid 1970s and mid 1980s to 67% opposed in 1996. Id. at 123-25.
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increasingly, prefer separation even after the effects of

historical conditioning have attenuated. 96 Suppose further
that, as a result of governmental efforts to equalize
opportunity in other areas of social life, white dominance
diminishes and the economic and political power of blacks
and whites becomes more equivalent. A society is certainly
conceivable where ethnic groups freely choose to live and
Black support over time for the principle of integrated schools has
always been nearly unanimous, and blacks have expressed little
opposition to attending school with whites no matter what the numbers.
Id. at 240-41,254-55. Yet black support for federal efforts to "see to
it" consistently declined from over 80% in the mid 1960s to less than
60% in the mid 1990s. On the other hand, while blacks were about
evenly divided between support for and opposition to forced busing
when it first started in the mid to late 1970s, by the mid 1990s support
for forced busing rose somewhat to about 60%. Id. at 248-49.
96 The debate in recent years over whether previously dejure
segregated schools should be relieved of their judicially supervised
obligation to desegregate turns on differing perceptions of whether the
vestiges ofdejure segregation have in fact sufficiently attenuated,
despite the persistence of de facto residential and school segregation,
that school districts should not be held responsible for the on-going
segregation. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,495-96 (1992):
Where resegregation is a product not of state action but
of private choices, it does not have constitutional
implications. As the dejure violation becomes more
remote in time and these demographic changes
intervene, it becomes less likely that a current racial
imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the priorde
jure system.
Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50
(1991) (standard for determining whether desegregation decree should
have been terminated is whether school board "had complied in good
faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether
the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent
practicable."); Id. at 251-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I believe a
desegregation decree cannot be lifted so long as conditions likely to
inflict the stigmatic injury condemned in Brown Ipersist and there
remain feasible methods of eliminating such conditions.").
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go to school separately in order to preserve their ethnic
identity or because they just do not get along well in those
arenas, while they interrelate on equal terms in other areas
of social life. Under such circumstances, the justification
for forced integration weakens and can be seen as violating
the individual right to choose one's associations.
The United States seems somewhere in the middle.
As a result of both voluntary and forced integration, school
and neighborhood segregation decreased somewhat
following the demise of mandatory segregation. However,
most blacks and whites still continued to attend largely
segregated schools and live in
largely segregated neighborhoods, and racial separation in
those spheres has increased in recent years. 97 Overt racial
prejudice has decreased somewhat, 98 and the avenues of
opportunity have
97 Racial segregation in schools began to diminish in the late 1960s and
early 1970s when courts began to vigorously enforce desegregation.
The degree of racial separation of black children reached its lowest
point in the mid to late 1980s, has been increasing since then, and has
now returned to about the level of the earlier years. See, e.g., ERICA
BRANDENBURG & CHUNGMEI LEE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY CIIL
RIGHTS PROJECT, RACE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: RAPIDLY
RESEGREGATING SCHOOL DISTRICTS (2002) at

http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Race in Ame
ricanPublic_Schoolsl.pdf, ORFIELD, supra note 95, at 11-12, 15-16,
23-26, 28-42. These studies attribute the increased school segregation
of the 1990s to the movement of whites to suburbia, the increased
concentration of minorities in central cities, and the Supreme Court's
deemphasis on desegregation. See supra note 96. Orfield also reports
on high and unchanging levels of residential segregation between 19802000. ORFIELD, supranote 93, at 39-40. Despite black preference for
and increasingly favorable attitudes of whites toward residential
integration, see id. at n. 25, 44-45, 50 and infra note 98, segregation
may be high in fact due to the wide income differentials between blacks
and whites. See infra note 99.
98 Over the years there has been a substantial increase in white

willingness to vote for a black presidential candidate (from 63% "no"
in 1958 to 95% "yes" in 1997) and in favorable attitudes toward
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interracial marriage (from 62% support for laws against intermarriage
in 1963 to 87% opposition in 1996, and from 96% disapproval of
intermarriage in 195 8 to 67% approval in 1997). RACIAL ATTITUDES,
supra note 95, at 106-07. White support for the principle of integrated
education and willingness for their children to attend integrated schools
have also increased substantially, although they have been generally
unsupportive of forced integration. See infra note 95. Likewise, while
still somewhat ambivalent, whites have become more supportive of
residential integration. In 1963, 39% of whites strongly agreed and
only 19% strongly disagreed that whites should have the right to keep
blacks out of their neighborhoods; whereas by 1996, 65% strongly
disagreed and only 6% strongly agreed. Similarly, white support for
open housing laws grew from 34% in 1972 to 67% in 1996. RACIAL
ATTITUDES, supra note 95, at 106-07, 123-25. And while in 1958, 45%
of whites indicated they would definitely or might move if blacks
moved next door and 79% if blacks moved into the neighborhood in
great numbers, by 1997 the respective figures were 2% and 25%;
similarly, 69% of whites preferred all or mostly white neighborhoods in
1972, whereas by 1995 the figure declined to 43%. Id. at 140-41. See
also Maria Krysan, Data Update to RacialAttitudes in America (2002)
at http://tigger.uic.edu/ -krysan/racialattitudes.htm (reporting on polls
showing a decline between 1990 and 2000 from 48% to 31% in the
number of whites opposed or strongly opposed to living in
neighborhoods more than half black). By way of caveat, however,
surveys may not accurately reflect the extent of racial prejudice in light
of evidence that at times people answer survey questions falsely, either
intentionally so as to avoid responding in socially unacceptable ways or
unintentionally due to non-recognition of the disconnect between their
professed beliefs and their actual conduct. See, e.g., ROGER
TOURANGEAU, LANCE J. RIPS & KENNETH RAsINsKI, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF SURVEY RESPONSES 269-88 (2000).
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opened a bit; 99 but blacks are still subjected to substantial
racial discrimination, lOO and whites still disproportionately
99 The gap in high school graduation between whites and blacks has
decreased substantially over the years: in 1978, 67.9% of whites and
47.6% of blacks 25 and over had completed four or more years of high
school, whereas by 1998 the gap had decreased to 83.7% for whites
versus 76.0% for blacks; and for 25-29 year olds, the completion rates
for whites and blacks were virtually identical, 88.1% versus 87.6%.
However, while the gap has decreased over the years, the annual
graduation rate for blacks continues to lag behind that of whites (73.4%
versus 81.6% in 1998), and the gap actually increased a bit between
1994 and 1998. WILLLAM B. HARVEY, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC.,
MINORITIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 2000-2001, Tables 1 & 3 (2001).
On the other hand, while many more blacks attend college now than
before, due to a substantially lower graduation rate the gap in
completion rates has not improved over the years; between 1978 and
1998 the four-or-more-years-of-college completion rate for blacks 25
years or older increased from 7.2% to 14.7%, while the rate for whites
actually increased a bit more from 16.4% to 25.0%. Id. at Tables 3, 4,
9. Likewise, the income gap between whites and blacks continues to be
substantial, has remained about the same percentage-wise for the past
40 years or so, and in gross dollars has grown substantially over that
time. In 1967 mean family income for whites was $9,116 and for
blacks was $5,916, 65% of that for whites, whereas in 1998 the figure
for whites was $62,384 and for blacks was $38,563, 62% of that for

whites.

JOINT CENTER DATA BANK, JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND

at http://
www.jointcenter.org(DB/detaillincorm.htm#l (last updated Aug. 5,
ECONOMIC STUDIES INCOME AND WEALTH

2003).
100 See, e.g., Krysan, supra note 98 (reporting on 2000 survey showing
64% of blacks and 33% of whites believe discrimination is a cause of
racial inequality; 1999 survey showing 59% of blacks believe they do
not have as good a chance as whites to get jobs for which they are
qualified; and 2001 survey showing 51% and 47% of blacks believe
they do not have as good a chance as whites to get, respectively, either
housing they can afford or a good education, whereas almost 90% of
whites believe they do);

NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, supra note

93

(reporting that of those blacks polled who have tried to get a mortgage,
25% said they experienced discrimination); ORFIELD, supra note 93, at
nn.42-43 (reporting on continuing and massive discrimination against
blacks in housing); U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMM 'N,
RACE-BASED CHARGES at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/race.html (last
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dominate positions of power.' 0 ' Meanwhile, the
integrationist push following the end of mandatory
segregation seems to have waned somewhat in recent
years, 102 and there seems to be substantial support among

modified Feb. 6, 2003)(reporting during fiscal years 1992 -2001 an
annual average of more than 29,000 complaints of race-based
employment discrimination, of which roughly 12%-13% on the average
and 19% in 2000/2001 received meritorious resolutions).
101 African-Americans comprise about 12% of the population of the
United States. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF GENERAL
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000 (2001). As of Jan. 31, 2000,
the number of black elected officials, although at an all time high and
almost seven times the number in 1970, represented less than 2% of all
elected officials. DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL AND
ECON. STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL

SUMMARY, 2000 (2002) at http://www.jointcenter.org/whatsnew/beo2002/beo-map-charts/BEO-00.pdf. Additionally, blacks represent less
than 5% of federal judges, less than 4% of lawyers, and own only about
4% and account for less than 1% of the profits of the nation's non-farm
businesses. FED. JUDICIAL CTR. at
http://air.jc.gov/history/judgesfrm.html; ABA COMM'N ON RACIAL
AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE PROFESSION, MILES TO Go 2000:

PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 9 (2001) at
http://www.abanet.org/minorities; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, BLACKOWNED BUSINESSES: 1997 (Oct. 2000).
102 See, e.g., FARKAS, supra note 95 (reporting that both black and
white parents believe educational quality to be more important than
integration); NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, supra note 93 (reporting on 2001
survey of black adults showing 60% believing the primary focus of
black organizations should be economic opportunity, 24% political
leadership, and only 7% integration). But compare id. (also reporting
that 80% of blacks polled prefer living in racially mixed
neighborhoods); ORFIELD, supra note 93, at n.25 (reporting on a 1997
Gallup poll showing that blacks overwhelmingly prefer integrated to all
black areas); ORFIELD, supra note 95, at 7, 9-11 (arguing that
continuing efforts to desegregate schools is consistent with black
support for quality education in light of evidence that integration
improves opportunities for blacks).
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both blacks and whites for school vouchers and other free
choice options.' 03
At this juncture, it is an open question whether the
considerations supporting efforts to promote school
integration continue to outweigh those supporting freedom
of choice, as once thought. If a shift to freedom of choice
were to result in schools and communities available both
for those blacks and whites preferring ethnic homogeneity
and for those preferring diversity, and if it were to
contribute to equalized opportunity for blacks, then
freedom of choice would promote both associational and
egalitarian values. However, freedom of choice would
produce a stark conflict between these values and therefore
be of more dubious merit if it were to result in an inferior
education and fewer opportunities for blacks.

103

The degree of public support for vouchers may depend on the

wording of the question. In a 2003 Kaiser/Pew poll, 37% of the
respondents favored and 24% opposed government vouchers for private
or public schools, while 40% reported they didn't know enough to have
an opinion, at
http://www.publicagenda.org/issues/major-proposals-detail.cfm?issue_
type=education&list=14. In a 2003 Gallup/Phi Delta Kappa poll 38%
favored and 60% opposed allowing the choice of private schools at
public expense, while in a 2003 CBS News/New York Times poll 47%
agreed with and 49% disagreed with tax-funded vouchers for private or
religious schools, at
http://www.publicagenda.org/issues/major-proposalsdetail.cfm?issue_
type=education&list=15. The support for vouchers appears to be
somewhat greater among blacks than whites, although the support
among both groups may be declining. In polls conducted by the Joint
Center for Political and Economic Studies, in 1998, 48.1% of blacks
and 41.3% of whites supported vouchers, whereas in 1997 the figures
were 55.8% for blacks and 47.2% for whites. See JOINT CTR DATA
BANK, NATIONAL OPINION POLL 1996-2000 at
www.jointcenter.org/DB/detail/NOP.htm#Education (last updated Aug.
5, 2004). And the NAT'LURBAN LEAGUE, supra note 93, reported that
41% of blacks polled in 2000 supported vouchers, but only 34% in
2001.
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V. Associational Issues When Society Is a Party
Now let us address associational conflicts when
society itself is a party. First, consider situations when
some party wants out of an existing relationship with a
society, using emigration and secession as examples.
Currently, international law guarantees the right of people
to freely leave their countries, and most countries adhere to
this norm. 104 This right came about only after an intense
international campaign and over the objections of countries
(mostly underdeveloped or from the Communist bloc) who
feared that free emigration would harm them by the loss of
people whom they devote their resources to educate and 05
train and who might contribute to national development. 1
Individualistic considerations support the right to
freely emigrate, which is tantamount to empowering people
who do not want to associate with their countries to
unilaterally terminate that relationship. 106 This is akin to
allowing a party to a marriage to freely exit and is, in fact,
more favorable than the common practice under permissive
divorce laws that allow unilateral termination but often
require the relationship to continue through the imposition
of support obligations. Analogously, some countries allow
people to emigrate only after completing military or other

See Thomas Kleven, Why InternationalLaw FavorsEmigration
Over Immigration, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM ER. L. REV. 69, 71-73
(2002). The right to leave is guaranteed by the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Art. 13, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Art. 12(1)(2), and various regional treaties.
105 For a history of the international recognition of the right to freely
104

emigrate, see ALAN DOWTY,

CLOSED BORDERS: THE CONTEMPORARY

ASSAULT ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 1 11-41 (1987).

For a more thorough discussion of the individualistic and collective
considerations relating to freedom of movement in the international
context, see Kleven, supra note 104, at 74-83.
106
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mandatory public service and for professionals, like
doctors, only after practicing for a time.' 07
Such limitations represent a balancing of interests
between the claimed individual right to associate or not
with whom one chooses and collective considerations like
compensating society for the benefits one has received
during the association. Looking at society as analogous to
another person with whom a party might have an
association, compensation might be justified in
individualistic terms. The receipt of benefits from a society
can be seen as giving rise to a tacit agreement to perform
expected social obligations in return, or to an implied
contract to do so lest the party otherwise be unjustly
enriched at society's expense. As noted above, Locke
comes surprisingly close to using such reasoning to posit
that thereby someone becomes permanently tied to a
society so that one cannot later sever the relationship
without society's consent. 108 Furthermore, societies are
certainly conceivable where people are seen, akin to
Aristotle's view, as being irrevocably tied to their society
by virtue of birth, much like a family.
Although current international practice regarding
emigration is not so collectively tilted, such is not the case
with secession. When a group of people occupying a
particular portion of a country desire to withdraw and either
form their own nation or join another, the current
international standard and practice is that a nation's
sovereignty over its territory entitles it to prevent secession

107

See generally BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND

LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN

RIGHTS PRAcricEs Feb. 2000, at

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1 999. Cuba, for example, requires
doctors and other professionals to practice 3 to 5 years before being
eligible for an exit permit.
108 LocKE, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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without its consent. 109 There is, though, a free association
claim here, analogous to that of an emigrant's claim not to
have to remain in a society against one's will; or analogous
to the claim of religious or other groups within a society to
the right to a relatively autonomous sphere.
Again, the explanation for this divergence seems
one of context and scope, based on factors that heighten the
significance of collective considerations when a portion of
a country secedes. In the case of secession, people, land,
and other resources are lost, intensifying the harmful
1 refer here to the ability of part of an established international state
to freely secede without the consent of the State -- bearing in mind that
since international law is still not very highly developed and is still
heavily intertwined with power politics among nations, it is difficult to
be definitive about it. That said, the principles of self-determination
and non-intervention in the internal affairs of a State would seem to
imply that a State's laws govern when parts of a State may withdraw.
If a State's law permits withdrawal, even unilaterally, then there is
consent. If not, then it would seem that a State ordinarily has the right
to prevent a unilateral secession, by force if necessary, and that other
states are ordinarily obliged not to intervene (except perhaps to prevent
the excessive use of force or in those instances when there is a right to
secede). See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 84-106, 114-18,215-18 (1979). While a part of
a State might assert that unilateral secession is justified by its own right
of self-determination, the State's right of self-determination would
ordinarily seem to be overriding, except perhaps in the case of
oppression or misgovernment of an area. Id. at 86, 100, 115-17
(referring to "the possibility that the principle [of self-determination]
will apply to territories which are so badly misgoverned that they are in
effect alienated from the metropolitan State," but suggesting that the
concept is highly controversial and applicable, if at all in modem times,
only to Bangladesh). See also infra notes 111, 119. Now as a practical
matter part of a State may be strong enough to successfully secede
without consent, to establish de facto self-governance and other
incidents of statehood, and to receive recognition as a State by the
international community. Here it would seem more appropriate to say
not that the new State had a right to secede but that the international
community has acknowledged practical reality and ratified the
109

successful secession after the fact. See CRAWFORD, supra,at 248-66.
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impact on the rest of society. While the cumulative effect
of individual emigration can be substantial over time,
secession may cause an immediate and tremendous impact
with which society has more difficulty coping. 110 Unlike
group autonomy within a society, secession entails a more
complete departure from the association, whereas relatively
autonomous groups within a society are still subject to its
ultimate authority.
Still, if freedom of association is to be taken
seriously as a fundamental individual and group right, the
interests of territories that want to secede from a society
must be considered. Here, the rationale for the secession is
relevant. A portion of a society desiring secession because
it is being oppressed by the rest of society would have a
stronger claim than one that desires secession in an effort to
gain control over the bulk of a society's resources or to
engage in some practice like slavery that contravenes
society's fundamental values."' If society is not willing to
let a territory go, then it may have the obligation to
accommodate the desire for separation by providing
opportunities for relative autonomy, like decentralizing
110 Societies do at times suffer immediate mass emigrations in times of
famine, war or internal strife, frequently resulting from oppression

within the societies themselves. See, e.g., infra note 119 (regarding the
mass migration of millions of Hindus and Moslems between India and
Pakistan following partition); Susanne Schmeidl, Conflict and Forced
Migration:A QuantitativeReview, in GLOBAL MIGRANTS, GLOBAL

62 (Aristide R. Zolberg & Peter M. Benda, eds., 2001).
11 For commentary on the right to secede, see, e.g., Lea Brilmayer,
Secession and Self-Determination:A TerritorialInterpretation,16
YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991)(arguing for right to secede when territory
illegally annexed but not on grounds of nationality or group
REFUGEES

cohesiveness alone); Alan Buchanan, Federalism,Secession, and the

Morality ofInclusion, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 53 (1995)(arguing for right to
secede of groups suffering severe injustices at the hands of the state but
otherwise no general right to secede); Robert W. McGee, The Theory of

Secession and EmergingDemocracies:A ConstitutionalSolution, 28
STAN. J. INT'L L. 451 (1992)(arguing for a right to secede).
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society into states
or provinces with their own governments
112
and powers.
Now let us address situations when some party
wants to establish an association with a society, using
immigration and the merger of societies as examples.
Current international practice regarding immigration is
opposite from emigration. While a party is substantially
free to leave and sever the relationship with one's country,
there is no comparable right to enter and become a member
of another society. Pursuant to the principle of national
sovereignty, societies have the virtually unfettered right to
refuse entry to outsiders." 3 Similarly, a society's national
sovereignty4 entitles it to reject mergers sought by other
1
societies.
The principle of national sovereignty is analogous
to an individual's absolute right to refuse associations with
others. Just as there is reason to question the absoluteness
of such a right when its exercise would oppress others or
harm society, however, so the principle of national
112 See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1, 66:
In most instances, self-determination should come to
mean not statehood or independence, but the exercise of
what might be termed 'functional sovereignty.' This
functional sovereignty will assign to sub-state groups
the powers necessary to control political and economic
matters of direct relevance to them, while bearing in
mind the legitimate concerns of other segments of the
population and the state itself.
113 See Kleven, supra note 104, at 71.
114 Before the world-wide extension of the nation-state system, a state's
acquisition of territory by conquest or cession (typically under threat of
force) from indigenous peoples not inhabiting a recognized state was
commonplace. See CRAWFORD, supra note 109, at 173-74. In modem
times, forcible annexation or consolidation would clearly seem to
violate the principles of self-determination and non-intervention. Id. at
106-07, 112-13.
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sovereignty may overly protect nations' self-determination
against legitimate competing considerations. On the other
hand, there may be situations when a society is justified in
rejecting or limiting associations with outsiders in its
pursuit of collective self-determination. Again, a balancing
of interests is required, taking into account context and
scope.
Consider several scenarios, beginning with
immigration. Because it is virtually absolute, the principle
of national sovereignty entitles nations to treat outsiders in
ways that would violate the fundamental rights of its own
members. In American society, for example, while the
government may not discriminate on the basis of race
against its members (i.e., citizens and those allowed to
enter), it may indiscriminately do so, and did for much of
the twentieth century, when dealing with prospective
immigrants. 115 Members of this society have the right to
travel and settle where they please, and states and localities
may not refuse to accept them in their communities. 11 6 Yet
with regard to immigration, a nation's right to collective
self-determination overrides almost all competing
considerations. 117

115 See Kleven, supra note 104, at 86-87. Some commentators believe
the U.S.'s immigration practices are still racist, if not as explicitly so as
in the past. See id. at note 58.
116 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)(invalidating statute limiting
welfare benefits during first year of residency); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969)(invalidating statutes denying welfare assistance to
residents of less than one year); Edwards v. Cal., 314 U.S. 160 (1941)
(invalidating statute prohibiting the transport of indigents into the
state).
117 The only exception is that if someone can find their way into a
country, they may not be deported to another country where they would
face persecution. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
Art. 31-33 (adopted July 28, 1951 and entered into force Apr. 22,
1954).
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This leaves little room for individualistic values in
situations where human dignity is at stake. Suppose a
minority of the world's population occupies a
disproportionate share of the available land, wherein is
located a disproportionate share of the world's resources,
and as a result enjoys a disproportionately high standard of
living. And suppose people are suffering due to
burgeoning overpopulation and other crises to which welloff societies may have contributed through colonial
exploitation and environmental degradation. 8 Under
118 The world's population, now at about 6 billion, is expected to reach
between 8 and 11 billion by 2050, and most of the population grovwh
will be in the less developed parts of the world. World Population
Prospects: The 2000 Revision, U.N. Population Div., at 5, at
http://www.
un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2000/wpp2000_volume3.htm.
The relationship between population growth and poverty is unclear due
to the many variables. Does population growth in underdeveloped
areas cause poverty, such that what is needed are efforts to control
population growth to alleviate poverty? Or does poverty cause
population growth, such that development is needed to reduce poverty
which will lead to reduced population growth? The answer seems to be
sometimes one, the other and both, and sometimes neither because
other causal factors like environmental degradation are also at play.
See, e.g., Alain Marcoux, Populationand EnvironmentalChange:from
Linkages to Policy Issues, Sustainable Dev. Dep't, Food & Agric. Org.
of the U.N. (Jan. 1999), at
http://www.fao.org/sd/WPdirect/WPre0089.htm Geoffrey McNicoll,
Population and Poverty: The PolicyIssues, Sustainable Dev. Dep't,
Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N. (Jan. 1999), at
http://www.fao.org/sd/WPdirect/WPre0088.htm Some argue that
poorer countries should be responsible for solving their own
developmental and poverty problems. However, to the extent that
poverty does cause population growth and that the countries
experiencing the greatest population growth are poor as a result of past
and present exploitation by the richer nations, then the argument that
the richer nations should somehow assist either through helping to
relieve the population strain or with economic development and family
planning becomes stronger. See, e.g., ANDRE G. FRANK, CAPITALISM
AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT INLATIN AMERICA (1967); WALTER

61

130 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1]
these circumstances, according the well-off societies the
absolute privilege to refuse admittance based on the right of
national self-determination seems one-sided. Indeed, it
seems unlikely that nations would be accorded such a right
under a more highly developed international order, and its
existence today demonstrates the dominant power of the
world's wealthy nations over the rules of the game.
Similar considerations compete in the context of
societal mergers. To illustrate, consider the following two
hypotheticals: first, India proposes a reconsolidation with
Pakistan into a single unified nation; second, Puerto Rico
proposes that it be admitted to the United States as a state.
Although under current international practice both Pakistan
and the United States have the absolute right to reject these
associations, there are competing considerations and
arguable differences between the two situations.
One difference is that while India and Pakistan were
unified under British colonialism, that relationship was
severed;119 whereas as a territory of the United States,
RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA (1981); Edward
Goldsmith, Development as Colonialism,in THIE CASE AGAINST THE

GLOBAL EcONOMY253 (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds.,
1996). Moreover, a more communal view of the world as an
interdependent community might suggest that the world's richer

nations have a duty to aid the less well-off, whatever the cause of the
disparities. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 31-51 (1983)(discussing the
"duty to aid").

119 The division of the subcontinent into separate nation-states along

largely religious/ethnic lines (India being largely Hindu and Pakistan

largely Muslim) is an outgrowth of both the area's pre-colonial history
and also the impact of British domination of the subcontinent between
the middle of the 191h and 20h centuries. See, e.g., TALBOT, supra note

65, at 1-133. Despite Indian efforts to bring about a unified, multiethnic, secular nation in which Hindus would be the substantial

majority, Pakistani/Muslim separatism led to partition and the
establishment of India and Pakistan (with a western and eastern portion
on opposite sides of India) as separate nation-states in 1947,
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Puerto Rico is arguably a member of the society 120 and is
seeking the full-fledged statehood accorded to other
members. 121 To analogize to interpersonal relationships,
accompanied by the mass migration of millions of mostly Muslims
from India to Pakistan and of mostly Hindus from Pakistan to India.
Id. at 134-61. Both countries have experienced struggles among
various minority religious and ethnic groups. In Pakistan, Bengali
separatism led to the break away of Pakistan's eastern wing and the
formation of Bangladesh as an independent nation in 1971. Id. at 25259. India has experienced Sikh ethno -nationalism and demands for
internal autonomy as well as secession in the Punjab region. Id. at 26573. And India and Pakistan have been at loggerheads since
independence. See infra, note 122.
120 U.S. interest in Puerto Rico stems back to the earliest days of the
nation. Following the Spanish-American War, Spain ceded Puerto
Rico to the U.S. in 1899, and Puerto Rico was made and has since
remained a dependent territory of the U.S. Jost TRIAs MONGE,
PUERTO RIco: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD 21 29 (1997). In 1900, a civil government under the ultimate control of
the U.S. was established. Id. at 36-43. In 1917, Puerto Ricans were
granted American citizenship. Id. at 67-76. In 1951, following a
referendum approving it and subject still to ultimate U.S. authority,
Puerto Rico became self-governing and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico was established; and in 1952, the citizenry adopted and Congress
approved Puerto Rico's Constitution. Id. at 107-18. Throughout its
history as a territory, Puerto Rico's economy has been integrated into
and dependent on that of the U.S. James L. Dietz & Emilio PantojasGarcia, Puerto Rico's New Role in the Caribbean:The High-

Finance/MaquiladoraStrategy, in

COLONIAL DILEMMA: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY PUERTO RICO 103 (Edwin

Melendez & Edgardo Meldndez eds., 1993); Edwin Meldndez, Politics
and Economic Reforms in Post-War PuertoRico, Id. at 79.
1
Puerto Rico's status has been part of a long-standing debate.
MONGE, supra note 120. Within Puerto Rico, there have been three
non-binding plebiscites: in 1967, 1993 and 1998. In all three, there has
been substantial support for statehood, ranging from 39% in 1967 to
almost 47% in 1998. Independence has received minimal support,
below 5%. In 1967 and 1993, commonwealth status outpolled
statehood, although by a much larger margin in 1967 (60% to 39%)
than in 1993 (49% to 46%). See 1998 Status Plebiscite Vote Summary,
availableat http:/ electionspuertorico.org/1 998/summary.html; Estado
Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, Escrutinio del Plebscito del 23 de Julio
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one might say that India and Pakistan were at one time
married, divorced, and are now independent parties
deciding whether to renew the marriage; whereas, the
United States and Puerto Rico are now defacto married as
at common law, and Puerto Rico wants that status
legitimized in order to receive all the benefits of a formal
marriage.
A second difference is that the history of the
relations between Pakistan and India differs from that of
the United States and Puerto Rico, and the impact of a
merger on Pakistan and the United States differs. India and
Pakistan split primarily because of internal conflict
between Hindus and Muslims, and there is on-going
animosity between the two. 2 2 Pakistani Muslims would be
a small and disfavored minority in a unified country, and
even if India agreed to a relatively autonomous provincial
status for Pakistanis, they would have a legitimate fear of
oppression. On the other hand, Puerto Rico is arguably
already part of this society, has many of the responsibilities
de 1967, availableat http://electionspuertorico.org/archivo/1967.html.
Interpreting the results of the 1998 plebiscite is difficult because
statehood and independence were competing with two commonwealthlike alternatives - one similar to the present status of subjection to the
ultimate authority of Congress and the other consisting of full selfgovernance subject to undefined economic and defense ties to the U.S.
and with U.S. citizenship only for those already having it and their
descendents. Both alternatives received less than 1% support and
neither received 50% of the vote. See Manuel Alvarez-Rivera,

Elections in Cuba, 1998 PlebisciteStatus Definitions, at

http://eleccionespuertorico.org/home-en.html.

122 The on-going animosity has resulted in four wars and several near

wars, and has revolved largely around the Kashmir region of India,
whose population is largely Muslim and which both countries claim.
The causes of the conflict are varied and contested, and include not
only the religious/ethnic factor but also both countries' efforts at
nation-building and other geo-political factors as well. See, e.g., SuMrr
GANGULY, CONFLICT UNENDING: INDIA-PAKISTAN TENSIONS SINCE

1947 (2001).
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(e.g., military service, subjection to U.S. law) but not all the
benefits (e.g., seats in Congress, the right to vote for
President) of statehood,'2' and may have lost other
opportunities to flourish had it remained independent.
Under these circumstances, Pakistan seems to have a
stronger claim than the United States to avoid an unwanted
relationship with the other party. Furthermore, if the
United States were unwilling to admit Puerto Rico as a
state, it would seem obligated, after forcing it into an
unwanted relationship in the first place, to allow Puerto
Rico to become an independent nation if it so chooses.

VI. Conclusion
While the casual remark that people should be free
to choose with whom to associate or not to associate may
often be an appropriate response, I have tried to show that
in many contexts it is not. At times it may be appropriate
for society to prevent associations harmful to a party or
society as a whole, and at times it also may be appropriate
to impose associations on parties, even highly intimate
associations, when they have made commitments that
others have relied on or when it serves the common good.
Moreover, these considerations may be implicated when
society itself is a party to a contested relationship.
Inevitably, when associational conflicts arise, there
will be assertions of individual and group rights and of
collective interests on all sides, and it will be necessary to
assess the strength of the competing considerations in
social context. Rather than attempting to thoroughly
categorize the relevant contexts and considerations, I have
tried to establish that the notion of free choice in
123 MONGE, supra note 120, at 162-64; InfoPlease: Puerto Rico, at
http://infoplease.com/ipa/AOI 13949.
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associations is overly simplistic and to show that
associational conflicts are ubiquitous in social life and
relate to issues, like marriage, race relations, and
membership in society, that are central to human dignity
and the well-being of society.
As always when there is conflict over such issues,
there may be many perspectives and passionate
disagreement over the appropriate outcome and who should
be empowered to decide. The struggle for power in social
life is on-going, and associational conflicts are at the heart
of the struggle.

66

